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ABSTRACT
Climate change is a common sphere where an inter-jurisdictional
judicial discourse gradually evolves. Engaging with the reasoning of
other courts strengthens controversial judicial pronouncements in a
complex area of law and it reduces the risk of being an “outlier” when
domestic law is applied in the light of international law on climate
change. It upholds the promise of cooperative international law where
states address a common concern of humankind collectively, in this
instance, through their judicial branches. A coordinated, interjurisdictional judicial discourse protects the climate if regulatory gaps
arise or domestic efforts of governments in reducing emissions remain
inadequate. Conversely, deference to executive branches implies granting
a wide margin of appreciation to governments, even in pursuing policies
that risk achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal. The latter
approach nurtures the perception that climate change is an inherently
foreign policy issue, largely excluding judicial review. This Article rebuts
this perception and offers a legal analysis from the viewpoint that
justiciable climate change standards are defined by international law and
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that domestic law—including constitutional law—must be interpreted
and applied in the light of this international law. It spells out legal
parameters of effective rights protection within this framework of
international and national law and uses the right to a healthy
environment in the Norwegian Constitution as primary example to
develop an analytical argument that can be transferred to other
jurisdictions. This analytical argument comprises the full dimension of
the legal consequences that arise from the threat that extraterritorial
emissions pose to that constitutional right, given the global nature of
climate change impacts. In January 2020, the Borgarting Court of
Appeal was the first to recognize that extraterritorial emissions resulting
from combustion of Norwegian oil are significant for determining the risk
for the right to a healthy environment. This recognition was confirmed by
the Supreme Court of Norway in December 2020. This insight paves the
way for judiciaries to scrutinize the cumulative effects of global emissions
for their impact on the protection of constitutional rights to a healthy
environment. Judgments of other courts are used as “comparative units”
to substantiate that the dichotomy between deference to governments and
access to justice can be overcome if courts refuse to accept climate change
as a “no-go” area; and even enter into an inter-jurisdictional judicial
discourse to strengthen their position.
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I. INTRODUCTION
2020 was envisaged to be the year of rising ambition of the
international community in its endeavor to achieve net-zero
emissions by mid-century,1 at a time when the public health crisis
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was already looming and a
record-breaking heatwave in Siberia was well under way.2 As the
first western country to report enhanced ambition, Norway
submitted its updated climate target under the Paris Agreement
on February 7, 2020 before many parts of the world went into
their first “lockdown.”3 The new climate target forms part of
1. See 2020 Is a Pivotal Year for Climate – UN Chief and COP26 President, UNITED
NATIONS
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(Mar.
9,
2021), https://unfccc.int/news/2020-is-a-pivotal-year-for-climate-un-chief-and-cop26president [https://perma.cc/Q4TA-G8N6]. For the analysis of national pledges so far,
see UNFCCC, SYNTHESIS REPORT ON NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER
THE PARIS AGREEMENT, FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/2 (2021).
2. Carlo Caduff, What Went Wrong: Corona and the World After the Full Stop, MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 467, 468-69 (2020); see also WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION,
SIBERIAN
HEAT
OF
2020
1
(2020),
PROLONGED
https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/siberian-heatwave-of-2020-almost-impossiblewithout-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/N6Z9-FBR5].
3. Norway updated its first NDC as required by Decision 1/CP.21 para. 24 (and for
the future under art. 4(9) of the Paris Agreement.) The Paris Agreement, Dec., 12, 2015,
U.N.T.S. I-54113. The Norwegian Climate Change Act in § 5 requires the Government
(“shall”) to update its national target in 2020 and every 5 years thereafter and to report
this to the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament). See Lov om klimamål (klimaloven) (Act
Relating
to
Norway’s
Climate
Targets)
(2018),
available
at
https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2017-06-16-60 [https://perma.cc/AZN7-7FJ7]
(last visited Mar. 29, 2021) [hereinafter Climate Change Act]. The target must be based on
the best available science and as far as possible quantitative and measurable. Id. The
UNFCCC Secretariat published on February 26, 2021, the initial version of the report
that synthesizes information from the 48 NDCs, representing 75 Parties, that had
submitted by December 31, 2020, new or updated NDCs in response to paragraphs 23–
24 of decision 1/CP.21. See Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First
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Norway’s updated nationally determined contribution (“NDC”).4
At the domestic level, the Norwegian Climate Change Act
envisages the country’s transition to a low-carbon society by 2050.5
Accordingly, the country pledged to reduce its national
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions “by at least 50% and towards
55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030.”6 As part of the extended
climate cooperation between the European Union (“EU”),
Iceland, and Norway, the government promised to fulfil the
target of at least 40% GHG emission reductions between January
1, 2021 and December 31, 2030 in accordance with the EU’s
climate and energy framework.7

Session, Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1/CP.21, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1,
paras. 23-24. New NDCs are required from Parties in case the INDC contained a
timeframe of only up to 2025. Id. para. 23. For the UNFCCC Synthesis Report, see Rep.
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris
Agreement, FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/2. The following eight countries have submitted
their second NDCs: Grenada on December 1, 2020, Nepal on December 8, 2020, Tonga
and Suriname on December 9, 2019, Papua New Guinea on December 16, 2020, United
Arab Emirates on December 29, 2020, Argentina on December 30, 2020, and Marshall
Islands had updated its second NDC on 31 December 2020. For the interim registry on
NDCs,
see
NDC
Registry
(Interim),
UNFCC,
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx [https://perma.cc/R229QWAF] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
4. Ole Mathismoen, Regjeringen skjerper Norges klimamål. Vil halvere norske utslipp på
(Feb.
7,
2020),
ti
år.,
AFTENPOSTEN
https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/mRdXnL/regjeringen-skjerper-norgesklimamaal-vil-halvere-norske-utslipp-paa-ti-aar [https://perma.cc/KP2R-9RE5].
5. Climate Change Act, supra note 3, § 1. The Climate Change Act defines “A lowemission society means one where greenhouse gas emissions, on the basis of the best
available scientific knowledge, global emission trends and national circumstances, have
been reduced in order to avert adverse impacts of global warming, as described in Article
2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement of 12 December 2015.” Id. § 4.
6. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The new NDC states “Norway seeks to fulfil the
enhanced ambition through the climate cooperation with the European Union. In the
event that Norway’s enhanced nationally determined contribution goes beyond the
target set in the updated nationally determined contribution of the European Union,
Norway intends to use voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to
fulfil the part that goes beyond what is fulfilled through the climate cooperation with the
European Union.” Id.
7. Decision of the EEA Joint Committee para. 7, Oct. 25, 2019, No 269/2019,
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20191025.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M8W2-3XWF]. In Decision No 269/2019 of 25 October the
European Union, Iceland, and Norway formally agreed to extend the climate
cooperation for the period 2021–2030 by amending Protocol 31 of the EEA Agreement.
Id.
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The renewed Norwegian climate strategy is undoubtedly
ambitious. Nonetheless, it neglects one important challenge: the
petroleum industry. Norway is one of the biggest petroleum
producers in the world,8 and the oil and gas industry accounts for
50% of its annual Export Value.9 The majority of Norway’s
petroleum is exported, resulting in GHG emissions from
combustion worldwide. These are often referred to as downstream or scope-3 emissions. Norway is the seventh biggest
contributing state to the world’s total scope-3 emissions, and fossil
fuel exports constitute ten times the country’s national
emissions.10 This double role as self-proclaimed climate leader
and oil giant has been nicknamed the “Norwegian Paradox.”11
The “Norwegian Paradox” was put on the agenda when the
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy decided to award ten new
production licenses for petroleum activity in the Barents Sea in
June 2016 (“the decision”).12 The decision was described as “a
new chapter for the Norwegian petroleum industry,”13 and was
quickly subjected to public debate. Several environmental
organizations argued that the decision was in conflict with the
global need to reduce the concentration of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere and Norway’s ratification of the Paris Agreement,
which took place only days after the decision was made.14 The
8. See Total Energy Production 2018, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/international/rankings/world?pa=12&u=0&f=A&v=none&y=01%2
F01%2F2018 [https://perma.cc/J3TN-SR2T] (last visited Mar. 18, 2021).
9. NORSK OLJE OG GASS, FAKTA OM NORSK OLJE OG GASS 3 (Apr. 2019).
10. Hannah McKinnon et al., The Sky’s the limit. Norway. Why Norway should lead the
way in a managed decline of oil and gas extraction, OIL CHANGE INT’L (Aug. 9, 2017),
http://priceofoil.org/2017/08/09/the-skys-limit-norway-why-norway-should-lead-theway-in-a-managed-decline-of-oil-and-gas-extraction/ [https://perma.cc/X5QB-EQUH].
11. Somini Sengupta, Both Climate Leader and Oil Giant? A Norwegian Paradox, N. Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/world/europe/norwayclimate-oil.html [https://perma.cc/5AJA-DWH4].
12. Tildeling av Leteareal i 23. Konsesjonsrunde, REGJERINGEN.NO (May 18, 2016),
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/23.-konsesjonsrunde-tildeling/id2500924/
[https://perma.cc/QD7T-HJGB]. Prior to a decision on awarding concrete production
licences, an “opening” of relevant maritime areas for petroleum activities must occur.
See Lov om petroleumsvirksomhet (Act Relating to Petroleum Activities) § 3-1 (1996),
https://www.npd.no/en/regulations/acts/act-29-november-1996-no2.-72-relating-topetroleum-activities/ [https://perma.cc/KY2L-RXNP] [hereinafter The Petroleum Act].
13. Tildeling av Leteareal i 23. Konsesjonsrunde, supra note 12.
14. Anne Cecilie Remen, Bellona-Hague: Flaut og Pinlig, NRK (May 18 2016),
https://www.nrk.no/norge/23.-konsesjonsrunde-er-brudd-pa-parisavtalen.-1.12950784
[https://perma.cc/SF24-66X8]; see generally Paris Agreement, supra note 3; UNFCCC,
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environmental organizations Greenpeace Nordic and Nature and
Youth challenged the decision and sued the Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy, claiming that it violated their right to an
“environment that is conducive to health” guaranteed by Article
112 of the Norwegian Constitution (“Article 112”).15
The judgment of the Oslo District Court in Greenpeace
Nordic,16 as well as the subsequent judgments of the Borgarting
Court of Appeal17 and the Supreme Court of Norway,18 are part
of an emerging international trend of climate change litigation.19
A groundswell of cases demonstrates how rights provisions and
procedural duties of authorities that ultimately originate in rights

supra note 6; Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, Framework
Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (2016); Norge Har
(June
21,
2016),
Ratifisert
Parisavtalen,
REGJERINGEN.NO
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norge-har-ratifisert-parisavtalen/id2505365/
[https://perma.cc/8Z8X-WSMY].
15. Grunnlov
[Grl]
[Constitution]
art.
112
(Nor.),
https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17?q=grunnloven
[https://perma.cc/RMT9-LU5J] [hereinafter The Norwegian Constitution]. The
Norwegian Constitution was adopted on May 17, 1814, and the official translation is
provided by the Storting (Norwegian Parliament). Id. The Norwegian Constitution is the
second oldest written Constitution still in force. The Constitution, STORTINGET,
https://stortinget.no/en/In-English/About-the-Storting/The-Constitution/
[https://perma.cc/A2NQ-KBEF] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
16. Oslo tingrett [Oslo District Court], 2018-01-04 TOSLO-2016-166674 (Nor.)
[hereinafter Greenpeace Nordic District Court].
17. Borgarting lagmannsrett (Borgarting Court of Appeal) 2020-01-23, 18060499ASD-BORG/03 [hereinafter Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal].
18. Norges Hoyesterett, (Supreme Court) 2020-04-20, 20-051052SIV-HRET
[hereinafter Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court]. The decision was adopted by a majority
of 11 votes against 4, with three votes joining Justice Webster in dissent. Id.
19. There is a vast amount of literature in the field, analyzing different cases,
strategies, and the role of climate litigation generally. See Jacqueline Peel & Jolene Lin,
Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 679
(2019); Joana Setzer & Lisa Benjamin, Climate Change Litigation in the Global South: Filling
in Gaps, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 56, 56-60 (2020); Brian J. Preston, The Evolving Role
of Environmental Rights in Climate Change litigation, 2 CHINESE J. ENVT’L L. 131 (2018);
Jaqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?, 7
TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 37 (2017); Jacqueline Peel et al., Shaping the “Next Generation” of
Climate Change Litigation in Australia, 41 MELB. U. L. REV. 793 (2017); Geetanjali Ganguly
et al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 841 (2018); Kim Bouwer, Lessons from a Distorted Metaphor: The Holy Grail of
Climate Litigationm TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 1 (2020); David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An
Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual,
64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012).
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protection,20 are being utilized to influence regulatory climate
action of states in many different countries of the world,
including the examples discussed in this Article as “comparative
units.”21 These are the decision of the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands in State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation
(“Urgenda”),22 the judgment of the High Court of New Zealand in
Thomson v. Minister for Climate Change Issues (“Thomson”),23 the
ruling of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales
(Australia) in Gloucester Resources Limited v. Minister for Planning
(“Gloucester”),24 the decision of the High Court of South Africa in
Earthlife Johannesburg v. The Minister for the Environment (“Earthlife
Johannesburg”),25 the judgment of the National Environment
Tribunal of Kenya in Save Lamu et al. v. National Environmental
Management Authority and Amu Power Co. Ltd. (“Save Lamu”),26 the
ruling of the UK Court of Appeal in R. (on the application of Plan B
Earth) v. Secretary of State,27 and the recent judgment of the UK
Supreme Court that overturned the decision of the UK Court of
Appeal.28 While necessarily only representing a selection amidst
other potentially relevant judicial decisions, these cases represent
jurisdictions in the Global North and the Global South, and

20. John H. Knox (Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Council), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe,
Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, U.N. A/HRC/37/59, annex (Jan. 24, 2018);
PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 817 (4th ed. 2018); see also THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT (John
H. Knox & Ramin Pejan eds., 2018).
21. For traditional and new categories of comparative units in law, see Mathias
Siems, The Power of Comparative Law: What Types of Units Can Comparative Law Compare?,
67 AM. J. COMP. L. 861, 874 (2019).
22. Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 20 december 2019, NJ 2020, 19/00135 m.nt.
(Staat der Nederlanden/Stitchting Urgenda) (Neth.) [hereinafter The State of the
Netherlands v. Urgenda].
23. Thomson v. Minister for Climate Change Issues [2017] NZHC 733 (N.Z.)
[hereinafter Thomson].
24. Gloucester Resources Limited v. Minister for Planning, [2019] NSWLEC 7
(Austl.) [hereinafter Gloucester].
25. Earthlife Johannesburg v. Minister of Environmental Affairs 2017, Case No.
65662/16, (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Earthlife Johannesburg].
26. Save Lamu v. National Environmental Management Authority (2016), case No.
NEMA/ESIA /PSL/3798 (Kenya) [hereinafter Save Lamu].
27. R. (on the application of Plan B Earth Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for Transport
[2020] EWCA (Civ) 214 [hereinafter R. (on the application of Plan B Earth Ltd.)].
28. R. (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd. and others) v. Heathrow
Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 42 [hereinafter Heathrow].
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involve states with economies at different income levels.29 In all of
these cases, the outcome was determined through the judicial
approach towards applying domestic law in the context of
international law on climate change. Therefore, these cases cover
the two important dimensions of legal developments needed to
meet the Paris Agreement’s objectives. The first dimension is the
enactment of new laws on setting and implementing national
emission targets, and the second concerns the interpretation of
existing laws, including administrative and planning legislation,
to meet those climate targets.
The outcomes of climate lawsuits do not always allow for
identifying clear victories or failures. Legal progress can be, and
often is, small and subtle.30 Significant legal developments can
even be embedded in ostentatious unsuccessful cases. The rapidly
evolving climate science resolves scientific uncertainty,31 but that
does not always directly translate into reducing the legal

29. Fort the latest economic data of the World Bank on country specific income
rating, see World Bank Country and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK,
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bankcountry-and-lending-groups [https://perma.cc/MY3J-L89S] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
30. See, e.g., Verwaltungsgericht (VG) [Administrative Trial Court] Oct. 31, 2019,
Case 10 K 412.18, Backsen v. Germany (Ger.) [hereinafter VG]. The case was the first
“Urgenda”-style lawsuit against the German Federal Government. The case was filed with
the Berlin Administrative Court in 2018. Id. The Court held that the climate policy of the
Federal Government did not fall outside the judicial capacity of the courts, and that the
State had a duty to protect fundamental rights from climate change impacts. Id. at 12,
22-24. However, the measures taken by the government were not considered to be below
the minimum standard as required by the German Constitution. Id. at 23; see also Petra
Minnerop, The First German Climate Case, 22 ENV’T. L. REV. 215 (2020). Compare with Peel
& Lin, supra note 19; Preston, supra note 19; Ganguly, supra note 19; Brian J. Preston,
The Influence of Climate Change Litigation on Governments and the Private Sector, 2 CLIMATE
L. 485 (2011) [hereinafter Preston, Influence of Climate Change].
31. See Nick Watts et al., The 2019 report of The Lancet Countdown on health and climate
change: ensuring that the health of a child born today is not defined by a changing climate, 394
LANCET 1836 (2019); Friederike E.L. Otto et al., Towards an inventory of the impacts of
human-induced climate change, BULL. AM. METEOR. SOC’Y 1972 (2020); Geert Jan
Oldenborgh et al., Attribution of Extreme Rainfall from Hurricane Harvey, August 2017, 12
ENV’T. RSCH. LETTERS 12124009 (2017). For the latest figures see WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL ORG., THE STATE OF GREENHOUSE GAS IN THE ATMOSPHERE BASED ON
GLOBAL OBSERVATIONS THROUGH 2018 (2019); Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is
Warming, NAT’L AERONAUTICS SPACE ADMIN., https://climate.nasa.gov/scientificconsensus/ [https://perma.cc/XZT3-WC5F] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021); Maria L. Banda
& Scott Fulton, Litigating Climate Change in National Courts: Recent Trends and Developments
in Global Climate Law, 47 ENV’T. L. REP. 10,121, 10,130 (2017).
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challenges of climate litigation.32 Much depends on the concrete
facts and the domestic legal frameworks.
While courts might not yet have found a united judicial voice
in the climate change context, this Article uses the case law it
discusses to point out where the line between policy and law has
been drawn by the respective courts, and how they make
reference to other cases in defining their own standard of review.
At least in some instances, these decisions can be explained as
examples of an evolving inter-jurisdictional judicial discourse. An
emerging openness to foreign judicial reasoning in the climate
change context is especially apparent in two circumstances: when
judges cite the reasoning of foreign courts to strengthen their
own interpretation of national law in light of international law;
and when courts are opposing the legal positions of their own
governments. These references to decisions of foreign courts are
highly significant in a complex area such as climate change,
where judicial self-restraint is often not only induced by scientific
complexity, conflicting political questions, and different interests
at stake, but because of the perceived risk that “no-one” will
follow.33
The pivotal point in the decision of the Borgarting Court of
Appeal is that the Court clarified—for the first time since the
right to a healthy environment was incorporated in the
Norwegian Constitution—that GHG emissions from oil and gas
exported from Norway are relevant when assessing the State’s
measures under Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution. The
Oslo District Court had ruled in the first instance in favor of the
Norwegian government in January 201834 and the Borgarting
Court of Appeal confirmed the decision in January 2020.35
However, the Court of Appeal significantly changed the
interpretative scope of Article 112 in relation to extraterritorial

32. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504-05 (2007); Margaret Rosso
Grossman, Climate Change and the Individual, 66 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 345, 353 (2018). For a
novel approach to resolve causation in law, see Petra Minnerop & Friederike E.L. Otto,
Climate Change and Causation: Joining Law and Climate Science on the Basis of Formal Logic,
27 BUFF. ENV’T. L.J. 49 (2019-2020).
33. Ivar Alvik, The First Norwegian Climate Litigation, 11, J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS.
541, 544 (2018).
34. Greenpeace Nordic District Court, supra note 16.
35. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17.
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emissions.36 The Supreme Court of Norway granted leave to
appeal in April 2020 and delivered its judgment on December 22,
2020, shortly after the hearing on November 4, 2020.37 The
Supreme Court confirmed that climate change consequences are
more significant when emissions from combustion abroad are
also taken into consideration.38
Consistently, all three Norwegian courts agreed that Article
112 must be understood as a substantive rights provision that can
be invoked before the courts accordingly.39 The Court of Appeal,
however, went further than the District Court in saying that local
environmental harm resulting from petroleum production is not
the only consideration in Article 112 cases. Instead, the Court
included “all environmental harm that has been cited—local
environmental harm, greenhouse gas emissions that occur in
connection with the production of petroleum and greenhouse
gas emissions that occur in connection with combustion.”40 Based
on this interpretation of Article 112, the Court held that the
measures taken by the government had to be assessed against this
comprehensive definition of environmental harm41 and this
36. Id.
37. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18. The date for the hearings has
been announced on the Supreme Court’s webpages. See Berammingsliste, NORGES
HOYESTERETT,
https://www.domstol.no/Enkeltdomstol/hoyesterett/saksliste/berammingsliste/ [https://perma.cc/97ZT-DHZT] (last
visited Mar. 13, 2021).
38. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 155. It should be noted
that the proceedings before the Supreme Court only concerned a reduced number of
production licenses. Id. One license in Barents Sea South and two in Barents Sea SouthEast had been surrendered prior to the judgment, and in the case of the production
license that remained for the Barents Sea South-East, the operator had applied to
surrender 62 per cent of the area. However, parties and the Supreme Court agreed that
the legal interests still existed. Id. para. 18.
39. For a detailed discussion on a number of proposals from Members of the
Storting regarding the introduction of a right to an environment in the Constitution see
Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, paras. 93-103. The Supreme Court
found that the former Article 110 b was already intended for individuals or groups to be
able to bring the matter before the courts based directly on the constitutional provision
when the legislature has not taken a position on an environmental problem. Id. para.
104. This was also the case for Article 112. Id. para. 139. It was not disputed between the
parties that Article 112 covered both (traditional) environmental harm and climate
deterioration. Greenpeace Nordic District Court, supra note 16, at 18. The Court of Appeal
confirmed that Article 112 grants rights that can be reviewed before the courts.
Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 18.
40. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 19.
41. Id. at 7.
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analysis was confirmed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court found that “if activities abroad . . . cause harm in Norway,
this must be capable of being included.” The Court went on to
point out that “[o]ne example is combustion abroad of oil or gas
produced in Norway, when it leads to harm in Norway as well.”42
The Authors’ argument in this Article is anchored in this
broader definition of environmental harm which must be
considered when measures are taken by the State that could affect
the material scope of the right. The Authors draw out three major
implications of this interpretation of the constitutional right
under Article 112 for the State’s decision-making on granting
licenses to produce oil and for the judicial review of these
decisions. The first implication concerns the application of
statutory law—including the necessary Environmental Impact
Assessments (“EIA”)—in the process of awarding production
licenses, in the light of, and to give effect to, constitutional law.
The second implication concerns the role of international
law for constitutional interpretation. International commitments
of reducing emissions and achieving a temperature goal jointly
with other states affect the margin of discretion the government
and the Storting have when granting oil production licenses.43
These international climate protection commitments have also
been democratically endorsed by the Storting. The Authors
contend that the rule of law demands that licensing decisions are
justiciable on the basis of Article 112 directly and that the
commitments of the State under the Paris Agreement narrow the
State’s margin of appreciation when it adopts measures that could
pose a threat to the right.
The third implication is that the decisions in Greenpeace
Nordic can be examined against the background of an emerging
inter-jurisdictional judicial discourse, where new legal patterns
for addressing the climate challenge through law emerge. In the
42. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 149.
43. The final decision on the opening of a new area for oil exploration rests with
the Storting. See Petroleum Act, supra note 12, §§ 1-2; Regulations to Act Relating to
Petroleum
Activities
§
6d,
available
at
https://www.npd.no/en/regulations/regulations/petroleum-activities/
[https://perma.cc/BFQ7-ZX73] (last visited Mar. 29, 2021) [hereinafter Petroleum
Regulations]. For an explanation of the discretion the Storting and the government have
when opening new maritime areas and granting oil production licenses, see Greenpeace
Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 157.
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context of this third implication, the Authors draw on
comparative case law44 to show how finding a justiciable standard
that traces a state’s existing international commitments to climate
protection is not an insurmountable challenge.45 The case law
evidences that other courts have found ways to define the
boundaries of state functions46 in the climate change context.
This supports that the agreed temperature goal of the Paris
Agreement and the size of the remaining global carbon budget
that flows from it,47 have been used by these courts to limit their
respective government’s margin of appreciation for decisionmaking at different levels of governance.48 Furthermore,
integrating Greenpeace Nordic within this emerging pattern of a
judicial practice where recourse is taken to foreign judgments,
stresses the importance of the case for finding that extraterritorial
emissions must be included in the scope of a constitutional right
to a healthy environment. This sends a strong signal to other
jurisdictions.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part II, the Authors
will first consider the substantial content of the right to a healthy
environment under Article 112, beginning with the drafting
history of the provision, before analyzing the Borgarting Court of
Appeal’s judgment and the Supreme Court’s judgment in
Greenpeace Nordic. Given that scope-3 emissions pose a risk to the
constitutional right, Part II then examines how the Norwegian
Petroleum Act accounts for the wider risk analysis that is required
by the Constitution.
44. These cases will be our units of comparison in a transnational perspective.
45. See Mathias Siems, supra note 21, at 874 (2019); see also Mathias Forteau,
Comparative International Law Within, Not Against, International Law: Lessons from the
International Law Commission, in COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (Anthea Roberts
et al. eds., 2018).
46. See Han-Ru Zhou, Legal Principles, Constitutional Principles, and Judicial Review, 67
AM. J. COMP. L. 899 (2019).
47. The IPCC defines the remaining carbon budget as follows: “Estimated
cumulative net global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from a given start date to the time
that anthropogenic CO2 emissions reach net zero that would result, at some probability,
in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other
anthropogenic emissions.” IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C 26 (2018)
[hereinafter IPCC 2018].
48. As such, learning from the reasoning of other courts has an immediate practical
function within comparative law. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE LONELINESS OF THE
COMPARATIVE LAWYER AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 478
(1999).

2021]

IN SEARCH OF A FAIR SHARE

859

Part III discusses if and how Article 112 can be interpreted
in the light of international law on climate change. In Part IV, the
Authors draw on the emerging jurisprudence of other courts,
where judicial review has tested governmental and administrative
decisions because of their climate change impacts. These
decisions are examples of courts’ interventions to identify the
respective state’s “fair share” and administrative diligence in
tackling climate change, thereby spelling out the consequences
of their own government’s international climate commitments.
On that basis, this Article develops a transferable, analytical
argument for finding a concrete standard of judicial review and
tests it against the main counterargument: the wide margin of
appreciation of the State in climate policy-making. For brevity
and clarity, the argument is developed and tested in relation to
Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution and the State’s margin
of appreciation in protecting the rights thereunder. However, a
structurally similar argument applies to other jurisdictions that
include, explicitly or impliedly, a fundamental right to a healthy
environment that must be interpreted in the context of
international climate protection commitments and the promise
of a temperature goal that avoids the worst-case scenarios of
climate change.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 112 OF
THE NORWEGIAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS APPLICATION IN
THE CASE LAW
The right to a healthy environment in Article 112 was
implemented during the constitutional reform in 2014 to
strengthen the constitutional guarantee of an environmental
right.49 Article 112 combines a substantive rights provision in its
first two paragraphs with a requirement for the authorities to fulfil

49. Ole K. Fauchald, Forfatning og miljøverk – en analyse av grunnlovens § 110 b, 1
TIDSSKRIFT FOR RETTSVITENSKAP 71-73, 82-83 (2007). After analyzing the use of Article
100 b by Norwegian courts and authorities, the Author argues that the article has had
little legal effect, and that it was primarily used as a supportive argument. Kontroll og
Konstitusjonskomiteen (The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional
Affairs), Innst.187 S (2013-2014) (May 7, 2014) at 25 (Preparatory document regarding
the Constitutional Reform).
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an “active duty” to take “adequate and necessary” measures in
order to protect the environment in the third paragraph.50
The English version of Article 11251 in the official translation
reads:
Every person has the right to an environment that is
conducive to health and to a natural environment whose
productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural resources
shall be managed on the basis of comprehensive long-term
considerations which will safeguard this right for future
generations as well.
In order to safeguard their right in accordance with the
foregoing paragraph, citizens are entitled to information on
the state of the natural environment and on the effects of any
encroachment on nature that is planned or carried out.
The authorities of the state shall take measures for the
implementation of these principles.52

This Part now turns to the constitutional interpretation of
Article 112 based on the drafting history and the scholarly
discussion, before turning to the application in the case law.

50. Preparatory document regarding the Constitutional Reform, supra note 49.
51. The Norwegian Constitution, supra note 15, art. 112 (Article 112 will also be
referred to throughout the text as the right to a healthy environment).
52. Id.
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A. The Drafting History
Article 112 is based on the former Article 110 b,53 which was
adopted in 1992.54 Article 110 b was introduced in the aftermath
of the 1987 Brundtland Commission’s report Our common future,
which pointed out the need for legal reforms in order to ensure
sustainable development.55 At this time, several other countries
were also introducing environmental provisions in their
constitutions,56 or ratifying regional human rights treaties to
include a specific or implied right to a clean or healthy
environment.57 Some courts are interpreting existing human
53. Article 110 b was adopted on May 25, 1992 by the Storting and came into force
the same day. Kgl. res. (Kongelig Resolusjon) 463 (FOR-1992-06-19-463) (1992) (Nor.).
Article 110 b reads:
Every Person has the Right to an Environment that is conducive to Health
and to a Natural Environment whose Productivity and Diversity are
maintained. Natural Resources shall be managed on the basis of
comprehensive long-term Considerations which will safeguard this Right for
Future Generations as well.
In order to safeguard their Right in Accordance with the foregoing
Paragraph, Citizens are entitled to Information on the State of the Natural
Environment and on the Effects of any Encroachment on Nature that is
planned or carried out.
The State Authorities shall issue further Provisions for the implementation
of these Principles.
Id. This is the translation used by the Supreme Court. See Greenpeace Nordic Supreme
Court, supra note 18, para. 105.
54. The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, supra note 49,
at 25.
55. See U.N. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development:
Our Common Future ann. I (1987) (proposing legal principles for the protection of the
environment). The World Commission on Environment and Development was created
in accordance with U.N. G.A. 38/161 and chaired by the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro
H. Brundtland. See generally id. “The State Authorities shall issue further Provisions for
the implementation of these Principles.” See Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note
34, para. 105.
56. In respect of adopting special provisions on climate protection at constitutional
level, it is worth to mention that only nine States include responsibilities concerning
climate change in their constitutions. These are Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Thailand, Tunisia, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam,
and Zambia, with draft constitutions in The Gambia and Yemen also addressing climate
change. See David R. Boyd, Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, Right to
a healthy environment: good practices, para. 50, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/53 (Dec. 30, 2019).
57. See id. para. 9 (emphasizing that the legal recognition of this right constitutes
“good practice, whether by means of constitutional protection, inclusion in
environmental legislation or through ratification of a regional treaty that includes the
right.”); DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF
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rights dynamically and innovatively so as to include a right to a
healthy environment,58 thereby demonstrating a growing
understanding of the scope of human rights instruments in the
context of the protection of natural resources.59 These provisions
and interpretations recognizing the right to a healthy
environment not only identify legal obligations which the State
owes to the individual, they may also call for a collective
responsibility for environmental protection. For instance, Article
20 of the Constitution of Finland states that “[n]ature and its
biodiversity, the environment and the national heritage are the
responsibility of everyone.”60
The aims of introducing Article 110 b (the predecessor of
the current Article 112) were again confirmed during the
discussion over constitutional reform in 2014. The inclusion of a
constitutional right to a healthy environment was viewed as a

CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2012); JAMES R. MAY & ERIN
DALY, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2014).
58. On February 6, 2020, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights handed down
a landmark decision in Caso Comunidades Indígenas Miembros de la Asociación Lhaka Honhat
(Nuestra Tierra) vs. Argentina, (Indigenous Communities Members of the Lhaka Honhat Ass’n
v. Argentina), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 6, 2020) (using Article 26 of the IACHR for the
first time in a contentious case). In an Advisory Opinion in 2018, the Court had already
found that the right included the right to a healthy environment. Advisory Opinion OC23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 23. Article 26 reads: “The States Parties undertake
to adopt measures, both internally and through international cooperation, especially
those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by
legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the
economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter
of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.”
American Convention on Human Rights art. 26, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. For
an overview of the protection of indigenous peoples in the Inter-American system, see
Maria Antonia Tigre & Sarah Slinger, A Voice in Development: The Right to Participation of
Indigenous Groups in Amazon Countries, in INDIGENOUS AMAZONIA, REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS: CONTENTIOUS ISSUES 460 (Walter Leal Filho
et al. eds., 2020). Human rights and environmental standards may even merge at the
domestic level into a new implied constitutional right to a healthy environment, an
example is the ruling of the High Court of Ireland where the increasing awareness of the
need for environmental protection led to the explicit recognition of an implied
constitutional right. Friends of the Irish Environment v. Fingal County Council [2017] IEHC
695 [264] [hereinafter Friends of the Irish Environment].
59. See the 2020 ILA Guidelines in Annex I of the Draft Resolution No 4/2020 on
“The Role of International Law in Sustainable Natural Resources Management for
Development,” Adopted during the Kyoto Conference of the International Law
Association, Nov. 29th-Dec. 13, 2020, para. 4.1.2.
60. Suomen perustuslaki (Constitution of Finland) 1 luku, § 20.

2021]

IN SEARCH OF A FAIR SHARE

863

means to provide rights and duties, and not purely principles,61
for two main reasons. The first reason concerns the Constitution’s
supremacy over other legislation. As anticipated by the so-called
Lønning Commission,62 a constitutional provision would be
paramount for the interpretation of ordinary legislation.63
Consequently, Article 110 b was envisaged to give guidance for
interpreting and applying administrative rules and procedures.64
The second reason was to guarantee access to judicial review in
the absence of specific legislation that would allow for courts to
enforce environmental protections. In those circumstances, the
constitutional provision was projected to be a guarantee for
individuals and organizations to access judicial review, based on
the constitutional right itself.65
The main motivation for replacing Article 110 b Norwegian
Constitution with the new Article 112 was to clarify that “the
authorities have an active duty to take care of the environment
through various forms of measures.”66 The Lønning Commission
acknowledged that there would still be room for political
discretion.67 However, the Commission specifically emphasized
that, in the light of the case law of the European Court of Human
61. The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, supra note 49,
at 25-26. The Committee held that Article 110 b was a rights provision, but that it was
found necessary to underline the Government’s duty to take active measures and ensure
that the provision had a function beyond being used as a principle for interpretation. Id.
62. Prior to the constitutional revision in 2014, the Storting’s Presidium appointed
a commission to consider the constitutional establishment of human rights, led by Inge
Lønning. The report from the so-called Lønning Commission or Human Rights
Commission was submitted to the Storting as Document No. 16 (2011-2012) [hereinafter
The Lønning Commission or The Human Rights Commission].
63. See id. at 243; see also Utenriks- og Konstitusjonskomiteen (The Standing
Comittee on Foreign and Constitutional Affairs), Innst. S. nr 163 (1991-1992), at 5
(holding that a constitutional environmental right will supersede other legislation and
regulations).
64. The Lønning Commission, supra note 62, at 243.
65. Id. This purpose was confirmed for the provision of Article 112 by the Supreme
Court. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 139 (“Nevertheless, Article
112 could be directly used before the courts when addressing environmental problems
for which legislators have not taken a position. What specifically is present in a possible
limitation of instances where legislators have taken a position on an issue may
nevertheless be unclear, since there are few ‘statutory voids’ in this area. In addition, a
distinction between when a position on an issue has been taken and when it has not can
be difficult to deal with in practice.”).
66. The Lønning Commission, supra note 62, at 245-46; see also The Standing
Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, supra note 49, at 25.
67. The Lønning Commission, supra note 62, at 246.
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Rights (“ECtHR”), the authorities could not be passive witnesses
to major environmental destruction.68 Instead, they were
required to adopt positive measures to ensure the protection of a
healthy environment for this and for future generations.69 The
Commission concluded that “this should be more clearly
expressed in the Norwegian constitution.”70 The Commission’s
reference to the ECtHR underlines the significance of the
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”)71 for the
development of the constitutional right to a healthy environment
and for the aim to enhance compliance with the legal72 concepts
developed by the ECtHR in relation to environmental
protection.73
The nature of Article 112 as a rights provision in
combination with the State’s duty to adopt protective measures
was discussed in the Norwegian Parliament (the “Storting”). As
evidenced by the Storting’s debate, the fundamental
environmental principles of the Brundtland Commission—which
heavily influenced the first wave of reforms to include the right to
a healthy environment—continued to exert a strong influence in
the formulation of Article 112.74 As a result, the original provision
was carried forward, confirming the rights-nature of the provision
and including some changes clarifying the authorities’—
including the Storting’s—active duty to take care of the
environment through various measures, in the third paragraph.75
Notably, Article 112 includes the right for future generations
as well.76 This entails a further standard against which protective
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. I-2889.
72. The Supreme Court in Greenpeace Nordic stated that
The Storting committee thus intended . . . for the constitutional provision to
have a number of legal effects. The provision was to be a constitutionallyestablished guideline for the legislative work. In addition, the provision was to
serve as an element in statutory interpretation and as a mandatory
consideration in the exercise of administrative discretion.
Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 113.
73. Id.
74. The Lønning Commission, supra note 62, at 246.
75. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court,
supra note 18, paras. 134, 137.
76. For an excerpt of Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution, see supra Part I.
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or restrictive measures under the provision must be evaluated.
Even if the right of the present generation is not restricted, the
right of future generations may well be, and it is this right of
future generations that must be equally protected even if there is
no immediate benefit for the present generation.77
B. Application of Article 112
The environmental rights provision has previously been used
only sporadically in cases before the courts. For example, the
judgment of the Norwegian Supreme Court in the case Lunner
Pukkverk concentrated on the obligation of the authorities to
adopt protective measures.78 It did not elaborate on the material
scope of Article 112 as a fundamental right. In fact, the rights
quality of Article 112 remained a contested issue until the
decision of the Oslo District Court in Greenpeace Nordic.79
Greenpeace Nordic concerned the decision from the Ministry
of Petroleum and Energy to award ten new production licenses in
the South and South East of the Barents Sea.80 A production
license gives the licensee the right to conduct exploration
activities in the awarded area. The licensee also becomes the
owner of any petroleum that is discovered.81 However, a
production license does not entail that extraction or production
can begin immediately. If the exploratory activities result in
findings, the license holder is required to develop a plan for
building and operation.82 The exact amount of forecasted CO2
emissions resulting from potential petroleum extraction based on
the awarded licenses is thus uncertain at this point. However,
77. HANS C. BUGGE, LÆREBOK I MILJØFORVALTNINGSRETT 171 (5th ed., 2019).
Bugge explains that actions or inactions by the State can be deemed unconstitutional if
they neglect or contribute to environmental problems that can have a negative effect on
people and/or nature in the future. Id.
78. Norsk Rettstidende [Rt.] [Reporter for Norwegian Supreme Court] 1993, p.
528, 534-535 Rt-1993-528 (204-93).
79. See Greenpeace Nordic District Court, supra note 16, at 13-18. See also Alvik, supra
note 33, at 543.
80. Press Release, Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Tildeling av
utvinningstillatelser23.
Konsesjonsrunde
(June
10,
2016),
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/tildeling-av-utvinningstillatelser—23.konsesjonsrunde/id2503831/) [https://perma.cc/9B7T-N6BQ].
81. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12, §§ 3-1, 3-3. The legal framework that regulates
the process of granting production licenses will be discussed in detail infra Section I. C.
82. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12, § 4-2.
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estimates suggest extraction and production result in 4.5–22
million tonnes of CO2 emissions nationally, and 100–370 million
tonnes of CO2 emissions abroad from the exported petroleum.83
Environmental organizations Greenpeace Nordic and Nature
and Youth claimed that the decision to award new production
licenses would therefore result in elevated CO2 emissions
worldwide and increase Norway’s contribution to the climate
crisis.84 They argued that this violated the constitutional right to
“an environment that is conducive to health” and the State’s
obligation to manage natural resources in line with long-term
considerations “which will safeguard the right for future
generations” in Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution.85
The State, represented by the Ministry of Petroleum and
Energy, rejected any violation of Article 112.86 The State argued
that Article 112 did not provide for substantive rights enforceable
in court.87 In the State’s view, the Article protected common
interests and should function as a guideline for legislative and
regulatory activities.88 However, the Ministry acknowledged that
Article 112 included a duty for the authorities to take measures to
protect the environment.89 The Ministry took the position that
this duty was adequately fulfilled through the general rules
provided by the Parliament and the government.90 In any event,
it argued that the duty did not include measures regarding
emissions from exported petroleum.91
The Oslo District Court agreed with the claimants that
Article 112 was a substantive rights provision.92 However, the
Court also concluded that emissions from combustion were too
remote and involved overall assessments outside of the scope of
judicial review.93 It concluded that the decision to award new
83. Greenpeace Nordic District Court, supra note 16, at 21-22.
84. Id.
85. The Norwegian Constitution, supra note 15, art. 112.
86. Greenpeace Nordic District Court, supra note 16, at 9.
87. Id. at 9, 10.
88. Id. at 10
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 18.
93. Id. at 28. The Court also found that how Norwegian authorities would be able
to fulfill their duty to take measures for exported oil and gas had not been clarified. Id.
at 19.
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production licenses did not violate the right.94 This was confirmed
by the Borgarting Court of Appeal, but with a slightly different
reasoning.95 The Borgarting Court of Appeal confirmed Article
112 as a rights provision that could be invoked before the courts,
after a careful examination of the preparatory works in the
context with the predecessor provision of Article 110 b.96 In this
regard, the Court held that:
. . . based on the background and the preparatory works for
Article 110 b, it must be assumed that the provision could be
invoked directly in areas where there were no ‘specific
provisions’ under the third paragraph, and for the right to
information under the second paragraph, but it was unclear
whether the provision granted rights beyond this.97

The Court of Appeal also clarified that Article 112 addressed
a right of future generations, to ensure that natural resources are
managed in a way that “will safeguard this right for future
generations as well.”98 For the Court of Appeal, the reference to
future generations implied a concern for democracy, given that
future generations were unable to influence today’s political
processes.99
In contrast to the District Court, the Court of Appeal
reasoned that scope-3 emissions, arising from extraterritorial
combustion, are relevant when assessing the State’s measures to
protect the right.100 The Court of Appeal stated that “Article 112
of the Norwegian Constitution will lose its function as a limit for
this type of emissions if the harmful effects are only assessed in
isolation.”101 While the Court of Appeal recognized that the
starting point for effective protection must be emissions that will
result from the decision, in this instance the twenty-third
Licensing Round, the greatest emissions occur in connection with
combustion.102 Therefore, and out of the need for a
94. Id. at 28.
95. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 11.
96. Id. at 17.
97. Id. at 14.
98. The Norwegian Constitution, supra note 15, art. 112.
99. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 17-18.
100. Id. at 21.
101. Id. at 20.
102. The Court found that these would be about twenty times greater than the
emissions in the production. Id. at 21.
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comprehensive approach to protect future generations, the
Court of Appeal held that emissions from the combustion after
export and their effects on the climate must also be examined.103
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal addressed the
government’s argument that the international climate
agreements, including the Paris Agreement, are based on the
obligation of each state to account only for territorial GHG
emissions. The Court pointed out that the accounting rules under
the international climate change regime were not based on an
inherent legal limitation but on practical reasons.104 The Court
emphasized that the international approach would not stand in
the way of considering emissions from combustion at the national
level, to guarantee a full protection of the right under Article
112.105
The Supreme Court took a more conservative stance and
reasoned that national climate policy was based on the division
that resulted from international agreements. It stated that a clear
principle that could be derived from these agreements was that
each state is responsible for the combustion on its own territory.106
The Supreme Court acknowledged, however, that the climate
impacts would “particularly come to the fore when emissions
from combustion, which mainly occurs abroad, are included.”107
The Court of Appeal had held that even in a situation where
total GHG emissions must be reduced, there could still be “room”
for emissions, “even in a low emissions society.”108 According to
the Court, this would depend:
on the existence of measures directed at other emissions and
an overall strategy for the measures. There is no reason to
conceal the fact that such an exercise can be difficult, in
purely [practical] terms as well as in terms of demarcation of
what should remain political processes. A separate question
is whether such an assessment means that any decision with
climate consequences can be challenged irrespective of how
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. See also id. at 31 (“The Court of Appeal wishes to emphasise that it is
particularly when emissions are also included from the combustion that the climaterelated consequences come to the fore”.).
106. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, at para. 159.
107. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, para. 155.
108. Id. at 27-28.
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significant the isolated consequences of the decision might
be.109

However, awarding a production license is not just any
decision with climate consequences. It is the starting point for,
and lays the foundation of, further fossil fuel production and
consumption.110 The Supreme Court acknowledged that “the
consequences of climate change in Norway will undoubtedly lead
to loss of human life, for example through floods or
landslides.”111 However, it also held that there was no sufficiently
clear link between the production licenses in the twenty-third
Licensing Round and the possible loss of human life, so that the
requirement for ‟actual and imminent risk” was not met.112 Thus,
while accepting that a general causal link existed between
increasing emissions and the certainty that lives will be lost
because of climate change impacts, the Supreme Court was not
convinced that a specific causal link could be established between
future emissions that would result from the production license
and an imminent risks for individual rights.113
This reasoning seems to ignore the reality that production
licenses are awarded with the purpose of oil production, even if
production cannot begin immediately.114 Furthermore, the
amount of additional GHG emissions can be calculated based on
the size of the resource base, i.e., the expected amount of fossil
fuel that will be discovered.115 However, at no point in time were
109. Id. at 20. The Supreme Court made reference to the reports that were
presented to the Storting that buttressed the finding of the Borgarting Court that there
will be room for oil and gas in a low-carbon society, without repeating explicitly that such
room-making could occur. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 237.
110. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 234 (“Combustion
emissions abroad are a general consequence of Norwegian petroleum activities and
petroleum policy.”).
111. Id. para. 167.
112. Id. paras. 167-68. At this point the Court was considering the rights under the
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 8 (the
right to family life). The Court confirmed that “The ECHR has been incorporated into
Norwegian law with precedence over other law, see Section 2 of the Norwegian Human
Rights Act, see Section 3.” Id. para. 165.
113. Id. para. 168 (stating “Firstly, it is uncertain whether or to what degree the
decision actually will lead to emissions of greenhouse gases.” and secondly, “the possible
effect for the climate is a good piece into the future.”).
114. For an overview of the process, see infra Section II.C.
115. See Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 194 (“The report to
the Storting on the opening of Barents Sea South-East, Report to the Storting No. 36
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these concrete expected future emissions considered in their
cumulative potential to interfere with the constitutional right
during the decision-making process that led to awarding the
licenses. This omission was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal
and by the Supreme Court.116 The Supreme Court referred to the
decision-making power of the government in relation to the
assessment how emissions from combustion will affect the
climate, i.e. depending on whether they would replace the use of
coal or compete with gas from other suppliers.117 This
hypothetical deliberation of the potential net contribution of the
expected emissions corroborates why the process of granting the
licenses was flawed in the present case. The decision to grant
production licenses was made without considering the effect of
the additional emissions, and without enabling the courts to
review the basis for the decision accordingly.
The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court both laid out
the criteria of the Norwegian Regulations on the Environmental
Impact Assessment (“EIA”) where environmental impacts ‟shall
include positive, negative, direct, indirect, temporary,
permanent, short-term and long-term effects.”118 Despite
acknowledging the relevance of emissions from combustion for
the constitutional right, the Court of Appeal could not see how a
“deficient assessment of emissions in connection with
combustion that occurs after export of oil and gas could have
been relevant for the substance of the decision.”119 The Supreme
Court confirmed that the scope and content of the EIA needed
to be determined with consideration for the effect from emissions
of CO2 and other greenhouse gasses—whether emitted
domestically or abroad.120 This finding was an “absolutely
fundamental aspect which must carry great weight in the

(2012–2013), page 13, mentions that the resource estimate for Barents Sea South- East
‘shows substantial estimated recoverable resources and a large upside potential’.”).
116. Id. para. 208.
117. Id. para. 234.
118. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 41; Greenpeace Nordic
Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 225 (discussion of the content and scope of the EIA.
119. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 41. The argument here
was that emissions from combustion are a known consequence of production, however,
“the net effect is simultaneously complicated and disputed, and the question of cuts in
the petroleum activities is the subject of ongoing political debate.” Id.
120. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 225.
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determination of the substance of the assessment duty.”121 The
Supreme Court emphasized the procedural element of Article
112 that required the rules governing petroleum activities of the
Norwegian Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Regulations to be
interpreted in the light of the constitutional provision.122
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that “[e]ven though the
effects of combustion of Norwegian oil and gas after any eventual
export after production in the Barents Sea South-East were not
specifically exemplified in the impact assessment itself—and later
in the opening report—the relevance for the global climate of
opening the area was a topic that was high on the political
agenda.”123
Both courts appeared to be reluctant to draw out the
consequences that flow from their interpretation of Article 112.
The result curtails, if not contradicts, the interpretation of both
the substantive scope and the full procedural dimension of the
constitutional right. Thus, the question of granting a production
license, without considering the concrete expected amount of
emissions, inevitably becomes a constitutional one.124
Two issues arise from that. First, because of the nature of
Article 112 as a constitutional rights provision, the right must be
accounted for when domestic law is applied by the authorities, to
ensure that statutory law is applied in conformity with the higherranking constitutional law. Second, in a situation where the
ordinary law does not sufficiently protect the constitutional right
or fails to be interpreted in accordance with the Constitution, the
constitutional right itself must serve as legal basis for judicial
review, as acknowledged in the preparatory works of the
environmental rights provision.125 These two issues will be
addressed in turn.

121. Id.
122. Id. para. 184.
123. Id. para. 229. The Supreme Court pointed out that a number of environmental
organizations had emphasized the role of climate change and the IPCC reports in a
consultation that followed the impact assessment. Id. para. 230.
124. This was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal, however, it then stated that
“There is no reason that the bases the Court of Appeal has set for the substantive review
against Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution, related to threshold and intensity of
review, should apply in the same manner to the procedural review.” Greenpeace Nordic
Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 37.
125. See supra Section II.A.
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C. Application of the Norwegian Petroleum Act in accordance with
Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution
Article 112 is a substantive rights provision, albeit one that
has been, according to the Authors’ analysis, not adequately
accounted for in the application of the procedural rules of the
Norwegian Petroleum Act. This is in contrast to the Borgarting
Court of Appeal’s reasoning—confirmed by the Supreme
Court—that the Norwegian Petroleum Act must be read in
connection with Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution.126
The Constitution demands that the State in its decision-making
process considers the territorial and extraterritorial GHG
emissions that occur in connection with combustion.127 Yet at no
point in the process—beginning with the opening of a new area
for exploration and granting petroleum licenses under the
Petroleum Act to the point where production can start—do the
procedural provisions require that the forecasted potential total of
GHG emissions is considered in the decision-making. In other
words, the legal obligation to protect the right from breaches
through extraterritorial emissions that arises under the
Constitution, does not translate into a specific provision at the
level of the current ordinary legislation. The opportunity to
establish an explicit legal rule that stipulates scrutinizing the risk
comprehensively, at a point in time where the State could still
effectively protect its people from further climate change, has not
materialized so far.
The Norwegian Petroleum Act provides for three main
stages in the process of petroleum production in a newly
designated area. The first stage consists of opening a new area.128
The final approval of the decision at this first stage rests with the
Storting, which bases its decision on the EIA129 conducted by the
126. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 26; Greenpeace Nordic
Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 184.
127. But cf. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, paras. 155, 184.
128. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12, § 3-1. For the development of the regulatory
regime see Erling Selvig, The Petroleum Act – A Regulatory Regime in Development, 513
SCANDINAVIAN INST. MAR. L. Y.B. 1 (2019).
129. See Neil Craik, The Assessment of Environmental Impact, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF COMP. ENVTL. L. 880 (Jorge E. Viñuales & Emma Lees eds., 2019). For the argument
that climate change assessment forms part of an EIA as an emerging rule of customary
international law, see Benoit Mayer, Climate Assessment as an Emerging Obligation under
Customary International Law, 68 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 271 (2019). For the aspect of
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Ministry for Petroleum and Energy.130 At the second stage,
production licenses are awarded (the award of these licenses
triggered the proceedings in Greenpeace Nordic) and this
constitutes the transfer of exclusive rights to the licensee to
conduct surveys and search for petroleum within the geographic
area covered by the license.131 The license assigns ownership of
the petroleum to the licensee, however, it does not grant the
permission to start production.132 Production can only begin after
the third stage is completed. The third stage concerns the
approval of the plan for development and operation (“PDO”)
which the licensee must submit before production can begin.133
The PDO must be approved through a decision of the Ministry.134
The Supreme Court clarified in Greenpeace Nordic that from its
point of view, the production license does not entitle the license
holder to a legal claim to approval of a PDO.135
An EIA must be conducted at the first stage in this process
and is usually required at the third stage,136 but not for the second
stage where the production licenses are granted.137 This has
several consequences for the protection of the constitutional
right. At the first stage of opening a new area and designating it
for future licensing, the EIA has the objective to “elucidate the
consequences the opening of an area for petroleum activities may
have on commercial activities and environmental aspects,
including the possibility of pollution and expected economic and
social effects.”138 The Petroleum Act provides a list of aspects that
procedural law, see Jutta Brunnée, Community Obligations in International Environmental
Law: Procedural Aspects, in COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS ACROSS INTERNATIONAL LAW 150
(Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., 2018).
130. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12, §§ 3-5, 3-7.
131. Id. § 3-3.
132. Alvik, supra note 33, at 543. See also Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra
note 18, para. 220 (stating the primary effect is that no others can produce).
133. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12, § 4-2.
134. Id.
135. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 220.
136. See, e.g., Petroleum Regulations, supra note 43, § 22b (“The Ministry may, on
application from the licensee, grant exemption from the requirement relating to impact
assessment if the development concerned will not entail production of oil and natural
gas for commercial purposes where the amount produced exceeds 4.000 barrels per day
in respect of oil and 500.000 m3 natural gas per day in respect of gas, and it is otherwise
not expected to have significant effects on commercial activities or the environment.”).
137. See Petroleum Regulations, supra note 43, §§ 6c, 22a.
138. Id. at § 6a.
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must be considered in the EIA, such as the impacts on living
conditions for animals and plants and in relation to water and air;
the climate is also mentioned.139 However, this has so far not been
interpreted as an obligation to assess the “overall consequences
for the world’s climate resulting from increased Norwegian
production of oil and gas as a result of opening new areas.”140 In
Greenpeace Nordic, the State argued that prospective findings were
still too uncertain to take combustion into account at that
point.141 The Supreme Court found that no procedural errors had
occurred at this first stage where the EIA was conducted;
downstream emission that would occur from combustion could
not be considered because there was still great uncertainty
regarding the quantity of petroleum that would be found.142
At the third stage and in advance of the submission of the
PDO, the licensee must submit to the Ministry a proposed
program for impact assessment and the Ministry will again assess
the economic prospects and environmental consequences of
developing the resource base into a producing field.143 At this
stage, the State has already transferred exclusive rights on the
resource base to the licensee.144 While the required PDO needs
to be approved by the Ministry and even in the light of the fact
that there is no legal right that the PDO will be approved as noted

139. Id. at § 6c(e) (“A description of the impact of opening the area for petroleum
activities in relation to, i.e.: living conditions for animals and plants, the sea bed, water,
air, climate, landscape, emergency preparedness and risk, and the joint impact of
these. . .”). The authorities have a general duty to investigate under procedural law to
clarify the case and provide information. Lov om behandlingsmåten i forvaltningssaker
(forvaltningsloven) (Act Relating to Procedure in Cases Concerning the Public
Administration) (1970) (Nor.).
140. Alvik, supra note 33, at 543, n.8.
141. Greenpeace Nordic District Court, supra note 16, at 12; Greenpeace Nordic Court
of Appeal, supra note 17, at 10.
142. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, paras. 223, 239. This is in
sharp contrast to the case law of the European Court of Justice. See Case C-404/09,
European Comm’n v. Kingdom of Spain., 2011 E.C.R. I-11897, paras. 78- 80 (regarding
the scope of application for the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, the Court
held an isolated assessment cannot be made of the environmental effects and that the
cumulative effects must be analyzed).
143. Petroleum Regulations, supra note 43, § 22.
144. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12, § 3-3. This was also acknowledged by the
Supreme Court. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 220 (stating that
“the licence holder is ensured an exclusive right to production through the production
licence, but the primary effect is that no others can produce.”).
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above,145 it is highly unlikely that the plan would be disapproved
in a way that would void the production license granted at the
previous stage of the process. This dilemma was acknowledged by
the Court of Appeal:
The parties disagree on whether denial, or approval of
conditions which in practice mean a denial, is a real
alternative. At this stage, a licensee will normally have
incurred costs in connection with exploration, on the basis of
an assumption of being able to cover these if commercially
exploitable discoveries are made.146

It is indeed difficult to see how a complete denial of the PDO
at that point in the process could be in accordance with the law.147
The wording of the Petroleum Act points towards limiting the
options to certain amendments of the PDO which cannot amount
to a factual withdrawal of the production license.148 Furthermore,
while the Act creates a legal requirement to submit a PDO for
approval prior to production, an EIA with a detailed account of
the impact on the environment with respect to a larger defined
area is at that point not necessarily conducted. By contrast, the
Ministry has discretion in that situation to decide if it demands an
extensive EIA prior to the PDO’s approval or not, it may ask for it
“when particular reasons so warrant.”149 In Greenpeace Nordic, the
145. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 222.
146. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 26.
147. It should be noted that this third stage was not part of the contentious
proceedings, the case concerned the production licenses at the second stage.
148. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12, §§ 4-1, 4-2.
149. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12, § 4-2 states:
If a licensee decides to develop a petroleum deposit, the licensee shall
submit to the Ministry for approval a plan for development and operation
of the petroleum deposit.
The plan shall contain an account of economic aspects, resource aspects,
technical, safety related, commercial and environmental aspects, as well
as information as to how a facility may be decommissioned and disposed
of when the petroleum activities have ceased. The plan shall also comprise
information on facilities for transportation or utilisation comprised by
Section 4-3. In the event that a facility is to be placed on the territory, the
plan shall in addition provide information about what applications for
licences etc. have been submitted according to other applicable
legislation.
The Ministry may, when particular reasons so warrant, require the licensee
to produce a detailed account of the impact on the environment, possible
risks of pollution and the impact on other affected activities, in respect of
a larger defined area.
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Supreme Court reasoned that the third stage would indeed be the
most appropriate time for assessing the specific global climate
effects of the production, and could even serve as a “remedy” to
correct previous decisions.150 It remains to be seen how this
interpretation of the Petroleum Act by the Supreme Court might
indeed raise the bar for the approval of a PDO through placing a
greater emphasis on the requirement of a comprehensive EIA at
that stage in the future.
If the Ministry issues a request for an EIA at that stage, the
licensee must produce “a detailed account of the impact on the
environment, possible risks of pollution and the impact on other
affected activities, in respect of a larger defined area.”151 The
wording of the Petroleum Act implies that the environmental
impacts that require closer consideration at that point will be
territorial and not related to the exploration and production
process. There is no explicit mention of climate change impacts
at that stage.152 The wording and the context of the relevant
provision in the Petroleum Act indicate that the provision aims at

If the development is planned in two or more stages, the plan shall, to the
extent possible, comprise the total development. The Ministry may limit
the approval to apply to individual stages.
Substantial contractual obligations must not be undertaken, nor
construction work be started, until the plan for development and
operation has been approved, unless by consent from the Ministry.
The Ministry may on application from a licensee waive the requirement
to submit a plan for development and operation.
The Ministry shall be notified of and shall approve any significant
deviation or alteration of the terms and preconditions on which a plan
has been submitted or approved and any significant alteration of facilities.
The Ministry may require a new or amended plan to be submitted for
approval.
150. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, paras. 216, 218, 246. “The
authorities will thus be able to correct – ‘remedy’ – through the ongoing process any
deficient assessment prior to the opening in 2013 of the combustion effect abroad from
future production of petroleum in Barents Sea South-East.” Id. para. 246. The lack of a
comprehensive EIA was not seen by the dissent as a procedural error in the light of
Article 112 nor as an option to “rectify” the fact that the EIA should have been carried
out at the opening stage. Id. paras. 273, 285 (Webster, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. For the wording of § 4-2, see supra note 149. The Supreme Court may have
changed the interpretation of the requirements for the future; it found that climate
effects will be assessed in the event of any application for a PDO. Greenpeace Nordic
Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 241.
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minimizing local environmental harm that could be caused
through the production process.153
It would indeed be difficult for the Ministry to demand from
the licensee that GHG emissions from combustion are addressed
at that stage, or in fact at any other stage during the procedure.
Even if that were to happen, requiring a change in the PDO based
on the fact that the production will lead to GHG emission from
combustion would be irreconcilable with the granting of the
production license in the first place. The license is awarded with
a view to starting production which will result in consumption, in
fact consumption is not only the consequence but the purpose of
production and the producer pays a license fee accordingly.
Thus, even if the licensee conducts an EIA at the third stage prior
to the PDO’s approval, this would, de lege lata, not include scrutiny
of the expected GHG emissions abroad and their effect for the
protected right under Article 112.
It is, however, possible that the PDO is approved under
certain conditions. Yet these additional burdens can also not lead
to a de-facto denial of production nor can further conditions be
conceived on the basis that GHG emissions from combustion will
occur. These form the core objective of granting the license and
are not included in the circumstances that the Petroleum Act
envisages as reasons that may lead to stricter requirements for the
operation of production activities.
This interpretation of the Petroleum Act, based on its
wording, may now change in the light of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Greenpeace Nordic. As already indicated above,
the Court found that
section 4-2 of the Norwegian Petroleum Act must
nevertheless be read in connection with Article 112 of the
Constitution. If the situation at the production stage has
become such that approving the production will be contrary
to Article 112 of the Constitution, the authorities will have
both the power and the duty not to approve the plan.154

153. The Petroleum Act, supra note 12. For the wording, see supra note 149. The
Petroleum Act, supra note 12, §§ 1-2, 3-1, 4-2, 5-3, 7-2, 10-1, 10-2, 10-10 (provisions of the
Petroleum Act referencing the environment).
154. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 222.
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So far, however, the remaining point in time at which a
constitutionally meaningful EIA that includes all potential GHG
emissions could have potentially been conducted, was the first
stage when new areas are designated for future licensing. This
also marks the point in time when the State still has full control
over the activities and thus, the protection of Article 112. In the
specific situation of granting the licenses in the Barents Sea, the
EIA at the first stage, when the area was opened for licensing, was
flawed not only because there were no precise calculations on the
extent of the resource base, but due to the fact that the
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate’s report on the resource base
(based on a geological survey) had not been available.155 In other
words, GHG emissions from combustion had not been taken into
account.156 Crucially, they were not even considered by the
authorities as being missing from the information that was
examined. Thus, despite the fact that GHG emissions from
combustion are relevant for defining whether or not the
constitutional right is under threat, the procedure under the
Petroleum Act does not stipulate that these are addressed when
licensing petroleum production that is anticipated to lead to
additional GHG emissions.
Furthermore, even if additional constraints based on
concerns for climate protection were placed on the licensee at
the third stage when the PDO is approved or even after that—
which would in accordance with the analysis offered here be
outside the explicit procedure under the Petroleum Act—the
State has at that stage already given away exclusive rights in
relation to the resource base. While the outcome of the impact
assessment may lead to some constraints for the operator, these
can neither amount to a complete denial of production nor to

155. In the words of the Borgarting Court of Appeal, “At the stage for impact
assessment, the basis was particularly weak, in that the Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate’s report on the resource base, based on a geological survey, was still not
available.” Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 39.
156. The Borgarting Court stated that “It would have been simple to calculate such
emissions on the basis of estimates for the high and low scenarios. This could have been
done to advantage.” Id. at 41. See also Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18,
para. 272 (Webster, J., dissenting) (“the Government acknowledges that the climate
impacts from the combustion emissions have not been assessed and evaluated in the
impact assessment. Nor have the combustion emissions been assessed and evaluated
specifically for Barents Sea South-East in other situations.”).
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enforcing constitutional constraints for extraterritorial fossil fuel
consumption to limit GHG emissions. Lastly, it was only in 2020
that the Borgarting Court of Appeal clarified for the first time that
scope-3 GHG emissions can interfere with the protected right.157
The national law has not been and could not have been applied
to give effect to this novel constitutional interpretation during the
opening of the maritime area and when the production licenses
in the twenty-third licensing round were issued. The Supreme
Court may now have found a way out of this situation in placing
an additional and potentially even remedial weight on the EIA
before approving the PDO.158
In a situation where the interpretation and application of the
ordinary law does not protect the constitutional right, the rights
dimension of Article 112 has an immediate effect in accordance
with the preparatory works of Article 112. As discussed above, if
the legislation does not create a mechanism through which the
right can be protected, then the right itself serves as the direct
basis for judicial review.159 The Borgarting Court of Appeal took
the view that the threshold for judicial review will be high, given
the margin that the State must retain for making economically
important decisions.160 The Supreme Court raised the bar and
stated that the threshold must be very high, and that:
Article 112 of the Constitution must be read, when the
Storting has considered a matter, as a safety valve. In order
for the courts to set aside a legislative decision by the Storting,
the Storting must have grossly disregarded its duties under
the third paragraph of Article 112. The same must apply for
other Storting decisions and decisions to which the Storting
has consented. The threshold is consequently very high.161

This confirms the view that has been expressed in the
literature that a duty of the State to make economic sacrifices
cannot be inferred from Article 112 of the Norwegian
Constitution alone, nor can reasonably be expected to apply if no
other state will follow.162 The Supreme Court exercised judicial
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Greenpeace Nordic, Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 41.
Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, paras. 222, 246.
Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 14.
Id. at 11, 19.
Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 142.
Alvik, supra note 33, at 544.
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self-restraint because it considered the function of Article 112(1)
as a rights provision that is sub-ordinated under the duty of the
Storting to take measures pursuant to Article 112(3). Since the
production license is a direct consequence of the Storting’s
consent to the opening of the maritime areas in question, the
Court found that “there is little left for the Supreme Court to
check.”163 The Supreme Court limited the scope of judicial review
to gross disregard.164
However, the Supreme Court also held that wider judicial
review was possible for administrative procedures165 and this is
where, as explained above, the lack of consideration for emissions
from combustion occurred. The following Part disputes the
premises upon which the argument that an unrestrained wide
margin of appreciation exists for decision-making that leads to
GHG emissions from combustion rests. It does this in two steps. It
will first be shown that existing international commitments lower
the threshold for judicial scrutiny because the margin of
appreciation that the State has is narrowed through its
international obligations. These international obligations were
also consented to by the Storting, and they define a minimum
standard of protection for the constitutional right. The rule of law
demands that courts exercise judicial scrutiny based on Article
112 directly, in the light of international climate commitments, in
a situation where the climate effects were not considered during
the licensing process. The precondition for this is that
international law is relevant for the interpretation of the
Norwegian Constitution. The second step concerns the
perception that “no one else will follow.” It will be demonstrated
that this view can no longer be supported on the basis of
burgeoning case law from other jurisdictions, where courts
identified benchmarks to measure executive and administrative
decision-making in the context of international law on climate
change.

163. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 157.
164. Id.
165. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 182.
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III. INTERPRETING ARTICLE 112 IN THE LIGHT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Relevance of International Law for Constitutional
Interpretation
The relevance of international law for constitutional
interpretation has sparked a debate amongst Norwegian legal
scholars. Different schools of thought revolve around the
dichotomy of a stricter autonomous approach—where it is argued
that international non-incorporated sources can only have a
limited indirect influence in constitutional interpretation—166
and the presumption that all domestic law complies with
international law.167 The former school of thought is based on
legal hierarchy, with the Constitution holding the highest rank.
Pursuant to a strict understanding of the lex superior principle,
legal sources placed lower in the judicial hierarchy cannot
determine constitutional content.168 A literal application of the
principle entails that incorporated human rights treaties cannot
influence the interpretation of a constitutional right.169 Even less
then, can non-incorporated international sources be considered,
due to their lack of democratic legitimacy.170
Conversely, the latter school of thought relies on the
presumption principle and holds that both incorporated and nonincorporated international law are relevant for the interpretation
of the Constitution.171 The presumption principle posits that
domestic law shall be presumed to be in accordance with
international law, and interpretation gives effect to this

166. EIVIND SMITH, KONSTITUTSJONELT DEMOKRATI 142- 143 (Fagbokforlaget, 4th
ed. 2017).
167. Anine Kierulf, Innenfra og utenfra- Grunnloven og menneskerettighetene, in 18142014 455 (Eirik Holmsøyvik ed. 2013).
168. For a closer examination of the lex superior principle, see SMITH, supra note 166,
chs. II.4, III.
169. Id. at 106-07.
170. Norway has a dualist legal system that requires incorporation of international
treaties into domestic law before they become legally binding for the State. This is the
opposite of a monist system. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-50 (8th ed. 2012); see also MARIUS STUB,
TILSYNSFORVALTNINGENS KONTROLLVIRKSOMHET 100 (2011).
171. Kierulf, supra note 167, at 455.
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presumption.172 Consequently, a statutory provision must be
interpreted to achieve harmonization with international law.173
This school of thought is supported by the Norwegian Human
Rights Commission. The Commission has stated that the
Constitution cannot be interpreted in isolation and that
international sources of law can be useful to supply the often
scarce and general wording of constitutional provisions.174
The Supreme Court also aligns its interpretation of
constitutional rights with international law, for instance in
relation to respect for one’s private life and children’s rights to
respect for their human dignity.175 According to the Supreme
Court, constitutional rights must be interpreted in the light of the
parallel provisions of the human rights treaties incorporated in
the 1999 Human Rights Act,176 to avoid that the “protection
172. See MORTEN RUUD & GEIR ULFSTEIN, INNFØRING I FOLKERETT 68-70 (5th ed.
2018); FREDRIK SEJERSTED ET A., EØS-RETT 165 (3d ed. 2011).
173. RUUD & ULFSTEIN, supra note 172, at 68; Alf Petter Høgberg & Benedikte
Moltunmyr Høgberg, Tolkning av Grunnloven, 48 JUSSENS VENNER 193, 205-06 (2013)
(arguing that the lex superior principle cannot be used to prohibit the use of international
law or human rights law but rather as a consolidator to harmonize the legal sources in
order for domestic and international law). The argument can be extended in the context
of an emerging inter-judicial discourse, where domestic law is not only applied in
harmony with international law by courts but international law is used in an attempt to
restrain governments. See Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of
Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 A. J. INT’L L. 241 (2008); Eyal
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of
International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59, 65 (2009); Olga Frishman, National Courts and
Interpretive Approaches to International law, in THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS: UNIFORMITY, DIVERSITY, CONVERGENCE (Helmut P. Aust &
Georg Nolte eds., 2016).
174. MENNESKERETTIGHETSUTVALGET [THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N], DOK. NO.
16, RAPPORT FRA MENNESKRETTIGHETSUTVALGET [REPORT FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION] 88 (2011) (Preparatory document from the Human Rights Commissions
regarding the Constitutional reform). See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
175. The Norwegian Constitution, supra note 15, arts. 102, 104.
176. Lov om styrking av menneskerettighetenes stilling i norsk rett [Act relating to
the strengthening of the status of human rights in Norwegian law (The Human Rights
Act)] (1999-30) (Nor.). The Norwegian Supreme Court has emphasized in Finnsbråten,
Rt. 2009 s. 1118, and in Maria, Rt. 2015 s. 93, that constitutional interpretation is a
primary function of the Court. Already in the groundbreaking judgment Grev Wedel
Jarlsberg v. Marinedepartementet from 1866 the Norwegian Supreme Court held that the
Court would not apply any law as far as the law was found to be in conflict with the
Constitution. See Arnfinn Bårdsen, The Norwegian Supreme Court as the Guardian of
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms, CTR. FOR EUR. L. para. 10 (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/artikler-og-foredrag/supremecourt—-constitutional-rights—-bardsen18092017.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP5U-D5JW].
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provided by the constitutional Bill of Rights falls short to that
provided for by the human right treaties to which Norway is a
party.”177 Furthermore, the Supreme Court awards significant
weight to statements from the UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child despite these being a non-legally binding source.178 The
Supreme Court has stated that the Committee’s reports
constituted a “natural basis” for constitutional interpretation.179
This is further evidence of the use of the presumption principle in
constitutional interpretation and shows that international sources
of law are regarded by the Supreme Court as being highly relevant
for constitutional interpretation, even without being
incorporated or legally binding.180
B. Interpreting Article 112 in the Light of the Climate Change Regime
Given that the Supreme Court itself opens the Constitution
to an interpretation that reconciles the fundamental rights
provision with international law, this Section proceeds to discuss
how Article 112 can be interpreted under the legal framework of
the current international climate change regime. The term
“international climate change regime” is used here
comprehensively to describe the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”)181 and the Paris
Agreement, both to which Norway is a contracting party.182 The
177. See Bårdsen, supra note 176, para. 23.
178. See, e.g., Norsk Rettstidende [Rt.] [Reporter for Norwegian Supreme Court],
2015 paras. 57, 64, Rt. 2015 s. 93 (Nor.) (stating that the Committee’s statements are a
natural starting point for interpretation); Geir Ulfstein, Høyesteretts anvendelse av
traktatorganers tolkningspraksis, LOV OG RETT 395 (2016); Randi Sigurdsen, Den
rettskildemessige betydningen av Barnekomiteens generelle kommentarer, 1 RETFÆRD 43 para. 64
(2014); Malcolm Langford & Beate K. Berge, Norway’s Constitution in a Comparative
Perspective, 6 OSLO L. REV. 198, 219, 222 (2019); see also Comm. on the Rights of the
Children, General Comment No. 14 (2013); On the Right of the Child to Have His or
Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14 (2013).
179. Rt. 2015 s. 93, para. 64.
180. In fact, this was again confirmed by the Supreme Court in Greenpeace Nordic,
where it stated that the ECHR has precedence over other law. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme
Court, supra note 18, para. 165.
181. UNFCCC, supra note 6.
182. Paris Agreement, supra note 3. Norway ratified the UNFCCC on July 9, 1993.
See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UN TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=27&subid=A&clang=_en
[https://perma.cc/KF9V-9FHM] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). Norway ratified the Paris
Agreement on June 20, 2016, and the Kyoto Protocol on May 30, 2002. See Norway, UN
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analysis will demonstrate how the global objectives in the regime
establish a standard against which the Norwegian State’s actions
can be measured, in order to comply with its constitutional
obligations in Article 112.
According to Article 2 of the UNFCCC, the ultimate
objective of the Convention is to stabilize the concentration of
GHG in the atmosphere and thus “prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interferences with the climate system.”183 It is
important to note that the objective is focused on the
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere rather than on
individual emissions. This reflects the global nature of climate
change in relation to both, its causes and its impacts.184 Article
4(1) of the UNFCCC sets out the general commitment of all
parties to implement national and regional programs concerning
their mitigation measures.185 Furthermore, Annex I countries186
should take the lead in combating climate change. To that end,
they have committed themselves to adopting national policies
and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate
change, through modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic
emissions, “recognizing that the return by the end of the present
decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouses would contribute to such
modification.”187 This concords with the aspiration to return,
individually or jointly, to their 1990 levels by the end of 2000 at
the time when the UNFCCC was concluded.188
The Paris Agreement is explicitly designed to enhance the
implementation of the objectives under the UNFCCC.189 Its
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/node/61132 [https://perma.cc/6LA7-PUG6]
(last visited June 2, 2020).
183. UNFCCC, supra note 6, art. 2.
184. DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 125 (2017).
185. UNFCCC, supra note 6, art. 4(1).
186. This distinction underpins the UNFCCC’s bifurcated approach between
developed and developing countries. The latter include emerging economies such as
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. See UNFCCC Parties, UN CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-andobserver-states?field_national_communications_target_id%5B515%5D=515
[https://perma.cc/XW26-TBUH] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
187. UNFCCC, supra note 6, art. 4(2)(a).
188. Id. art. 4(2)(b).
189. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2(1); see also Cinnamon P. Carlarne & J.D.
Colavecchio, Balancing Equity and Effectiveness: The Paris Agreement & The Future of
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overarching aim is to “strengthen the global response to the
threat of climate change”190 by keeping the average temperature
below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C
above pre-industrial levels.191 Furthermore, in order to reach the
agreed temperature target “Parties aim to reach global peaking
of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible.”192 Parties have
also agreed to set and report on nationally determined
contributions (“NDCs”)193 that reflect their best possible
ambition and represent a progression when compared with the
previous national target,194 and to make their best efforts in
reducing emissions and achieving the agreed objectives.195
The temperature goal of the Paris Agreement endorses scientific
evidence, a temperature increase of below 2 °C, ideally limited
nearer to 1.5 °C, is considered to be “safer” with regards to the
expected climate change impacts.196 Norway has committed itself
to pursuing this goal.197
Both the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are
international treaties198 and are therefore legally binding under
International Climate Change Law, 27 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 107 (2019); Daniel Bodansky, The
Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENV’T. L. 148 (2016).
190. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2(1).
191. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
192. Id. art. 4(1).
193. For the interim NDC registry, see Interim NDC Registry, supra note 3.
194. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4(3).
195. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4(2), 3; BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 184,
at 231-36.
196. This “safety” aspect of the temperature goal is intertwined with the human
rights protection envisaged in the preamble of the Paris Agreement. See John H. Knox,
The Paris Agreement as a Human Rights Treaty, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGES: POVERTY, CONFLICT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Dapo Akande et al. eds.,
2018).
197. Bugge, supra note 77, para. 165; Gøran Ø. Thengs, En standardtilnærming til
Grunnloven § 112 [A standard approach to Article 112 of the Constitution], 1 TIDSSKRIFT FOR
RETTSVITENSKAP 28 (2017). However, this is not an unanimously agreed view. See, e.g.,
Eivind Smith, Miljøparagrafen – kritisk lest [The environmental article – read critically], in
MELLOM JUS OG POLITIKK 151, 151-73 (Ole K. Fauchald ed., 2019).
198. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing the
variety of names under which international obligations may be entered into: “Treaties
are known by a variety of differing names, ranging from Conventions, International
Agreements, Pacts, General Acts, Charters, through to Statutes, Declarations and
Covenants. All these terms refer to a similar transaction, the creation of written
agreements whereby the states participating bind themselves legally to act in a particular
way or to set up particular relations between themselves. A series of conditions and
arrangements are laid out which the parties oblige themselves to carry out.”).
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the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).199
However, the legal form of these instruments must be
distinguished from the legal character of their specific provisions.
The scope of the legal obligations must therefore be determined
through interpretation of each provision.200 The 2018 “Paris
Rulebook” was adopted during the Katowice Conference of
Parties and provides further clarification on Parties’ common
understanding for the interpretation of the Paris Agreement and
for identifying the legal character of its provisions.201
Given its nature as a framework convention, it has been held
that UNFCCC Parties are left with considerable discretion when
defining rights and obligations.202 Following this view, the
UNFCCC would not support the existence of specific legal
obligations for its Contracting Parties to take climate change
measures. However, it has been argued that specific legal
obligations to adopt climate protection measures can be
established by interpreting the Convention’s objective to stabilize
GHG emissions (Article 2) in conjunction with the commitments
to mitigate climate change (Article 4(2)).203 The objective can be
operationalized if scientific evidence is translated into domestic
action that is able to achieve the UNFCCC’s object and purpose.
This is indeed supported by the requirement arising under the

199. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. For a discussion regarding the Paris
Agreement, see Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A new hope?, 110
AM. J. INT’L L. 288, 296 (2016). For a different perspective, see Anne-Marie Slaughter,
The Paris Approach to Global Governance, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Dec. 28, 2015),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/paris-agreement-model-for-globalgovernance-by-anne-marie-slaughter-2015-12?barrier=accesspaylog
[https://perma.cc/SM3J-23R3]. For a general overview of the development under the
UNFCCC, see BENOIT MAYER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2018).
200. Bodansky, supra note 199, at 296.
201. See Lavanya Rajamani & Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Rulebook: Balancing
International Prescriptiveness with National Discretion, 68 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1023 (2019);
Petra Minnerop, The Legal Effect of the ‘Paris Rulebook’ under the Doctrine of Treaty
Interpretation, in GLOBAL ENERGY IN TRANSITION. TOWARDS RULES-BASED MULTILATERAL
GOVERNANCE OF GENERATION, MARKETS AND INVESTMENT (P. Cameron, X. Mu & V.
Roeben eds., 2020); Jolene Lin & Alexander Zahar, Introduction to the Special Issue on the
Paris Rulebook, 9 CLIMATE L. 1 (2019) (pointing out that the Paris Rulebook is still
incomplete).
202. See Christina Voigt, State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages, 77 NORDIC J.
INT’L. L. 1, 5-7 (2008).
203. Id. at 7.
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VCLT that a state is “obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.”204
It has been pointed out that the Paris Agreement contains
provisions of the following diverse nature: those that create legal
obligations, those that generate expectations, provisions stating
recommendations or offering encouragement, provisions that set
aspirations, and others that capture understandings.205 This is
indicated by the deliberate wording in the Agreement, for
example, the use of the words “shall” and “aim” in Article 4(1)
and 4(2) respectively, as well as the differentiating references to
“each Party” or “Parties” throughout the text of the Agreement,
implying a varied strength in the legally binding force of rules for
the individual Party. The Paris Agreement’s influence that results
from this distinct set of international rules in domestic law has
been identified as a “ripple effect.”206 Indeed, the tiered
composition of rules ranging from concrete legal obligations for
each Party, to those provisions that establish a strong expectation
that all Parties will change their conduct to achieve a goal set for
the collective of Parties, does not prevent the Paris Agreement
from unfolding a distinct normative impact on domestic legal
orders. The clearly established commitment of the international
community to the temperature goal spelled out in the Paris
Agreement evidences the Parties’ shared understanding that
greater temperature increases will cause further adverse effects
on the climate.207 Infrastructure projects that lead to further
emissions, even if they are extraterritorial, will have an effect on
the ability of all states to meet this temperature target.

204. Vienna Convention, supra note 199, art. 18.
205. Bodansky, supra note 199, at 296; Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the
Paris Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COM. INT’L ENV’T L. 142, 145-47(2016); BODANSKY ET AL.,
supra note 184, at 251 (Table 7.1). For a critical stance, see Lucas Bergkamp & Scott J.
Stone, The Trojan Horse of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change: How Multi-Level, NonHierarchical Governance Poses a Threat to Constitutional Government, 23 ENV’T LIAB., L.
PRACT. & POL. 119, 127-28 (2015).
206. Brian J. Preston, The Influence of the Paris Agreement on Climate Litigation:
Causation, Corporate Governance and Catalyst (Part II), J. ENV’T L. 1, 21 (2020).
207. See Vienna Convention, supra note 199, art. 31(3)(a); see also Rajamani &
Bodansky, supra note 201, at 1027. For an interpretation of the Paris Rulebook in line
with the ILC Draft Conclusions, see Minnerop, supra note 201; see also 2018 ILC DRAFT
CONCLUSIONS ON SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE IN RELATION
TO
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES, https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_11.shtml
[https://perma.cc/8ATR-EJ32] (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
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For the Norwegian State, the commitment to the global
temperature goal means that the right under Article 112 will be
protected from a higher temperature increase. This was
confirmed in Greenpeace Nordic. The Borgarting Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court both agreed that international
agreements are relevant, with the Borgarting Court being very
explicit in saying that they will “be able to contribute to clarifying
what is an acceptable tolerance limit and appropriate
measures.”208
The next logical step would have been to acknowledge that
the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement gives a clear
direction for clarifying the tolerance limit and for defining
national measures accordingly, given that Parties designed the
Paris Agreement to include a strong “bottom up” approach
whereby national ambition complements an aspiring global goal.
In line with that, the Norwegian Climate Change Act sets out to
achieve “reductions of greenhouse gas emissions of the order of
80-95% from the level in the reference year 1990,” a target that
was introduced to “avert adverse impacts of global warming, as
described in Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement.”209 However,
despite acknowledging the significance of scope-3 emissions for
protecting the right to a healthy environment, in Greenpeace
Nordic, the courts refused to spell out the legal consequences of
their own interpretation of the material scope of Article 112. The
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court did not accept that the
additional extraterritorial GHG emissions limit the margin of
appreciation for the State and thereby re-define the threshold for
judicial review.210 The Court of Appeal considered the role of
prioritization of GHG emissions and the use of flexibility
mechanisms to “make room” for the expected emissions as
essential tools for the State to still be able to meet its climate
targets.211 As explained above, the State has not provided the

208. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 22. The Supreme Court is
less explicit on the matter. See Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, paras.
159, 174, 175.
209. Climate Change Act, supra note 3, § 4.
210. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 19, 22, 29.
211. Id. at 29; Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 234 (stating
that “In my view, it must then be up to the Ministry and the Government to decide
whether it was appropriate to refer to and deal with the question of climate effects at an
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evidence that this “room making” process can indeed take place,
conversely, the State acknowledged the high per capita GHG
emissions in Norway. It is difficult to see how this could be
reconciled with the agreed temperature goal under the Paris
Agreement. The Supreme Court recognized that on the one
hand, the rule of law calls upon the judiciary to set limits,
including for a political majority, when it comes to protecting
constitutional rights.212 On the other hand, the Court reasoned
that decisions in cases regarding fundamental environmental
issues often involve political balancing and broader prioritization,
thereby going beyond the competence of the courts.213 While this
is true, this should not allow the Court to avoid answering the
question, as a matter of the rule of law, how the international
agreements and the scientific evidence that they endorse, are
accounted for in the assessment of the margin of the State. It is
not clear why some international law, as demonstrated above, is
crucial for constitutional interpretation, while other legal
instruments are not given a similar weight. This risks ignoring that
the commitments made under the Paris Agreement already
determine much of the political balancing and the broader
prioritization that can still occur in any state.
As mentioned earlier, the Paris Agreement unfolds a wider
influence on domestic legal processes through providing states
with a rather unique composition of provisions. All of these are
targeted at guiding the conduct of states towards achieving the
required reductions of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.214
The following explains how this wider normative influence of the
Paris Agreement can be traced in some examples of the case law.

overarching level – in other words, as part of the Norwegian climate policy – instead of
discussing them in the specific impact assessment.”).
212. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 141.
213. Id.
214. It should be noted that the normative dimension of the Paris Agreement, for
instance the expectation that ambition will raise with each subsequent cycle of NDC
submissions in Article 4(3), has also been incorporated in more recent climate change
legislation. The German Climate Protection Act states in section 3(3) that climate targets
can only be increased not decreased. Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache [Climate
Protection Act], Oct. 22, 2019 19/14337 19 (Ger.). For further discussion of progression
in NDCs, see Lavanya Rajamani & Jutta Brunnée, The Legality of Downgrading Nationally
Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from the US Disengagement, 29 J.
ENV’T L. 537, 543 (2017).
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Particular attention will be given to instances where an emerging
inter-jurisdictional judicial climate discourse can be identified.215
IV. AN ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT EMERGING FROM AN
INTER-JURISDICTIONAL JUDICIAL DISCOURSE
This analysis will concentrate on the following judgments as
“comparative units:” Urgenda,216 Thomson,217 Gloucester,218 Earthlife
Johannesburg,219 Save Lamu,220 and the decisions of the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court in Heathrow.221 These judgments
are chosen because they represent decisions of courts situated in
different regions of the world, in states at various stages of
economic development, and because climate change was pivotal
for the outcome of these cases. While each of them presents
rather unique circumstances, the significance of applying
domestic law in the light of international law on climate change
in order to define the standard of judicial review resonates from
all of them at least to some extent. However, it should also be
noted that even within jurisdictions, a fragmented picture can
arise, as will be seen in the different approaches of the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court in Heathrow.
While for brevity and clarity this Article will analyze only
those cases mentioned at the outset, it is important to stress that
the selected cases form part of a wider picture of climate-relevant
litigation. The outcome of climate-related cases in courts does not
always allow identification of clear victory or failure; legal
developments can be small and subtle. Incremental changes can
occur in cases where climate protection concerns the periphery
rather than the legal core of the proceedings, such as cases
concerning the free allocation of emission allowances,222 and they
215. Petra Minnerop, Integrating the ‘duty of care’ under the European Convention on
Human Rights and the science and law of climate change: the decision of The Hague Court of
Appeal in the Urgenda case, 37 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 149, 173 (2019).
216. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda, supra note 22.
217. Thomson, supra note 23.
218. Gloucester, supra note 24.
219. Earthlife Johannesburg, supra note 25.
220. Save Lamu, supra note 26.
221. R. (on the application of Plan B Earth Ltd.), supra note 27; R. (on the application of
Friends of the Earth Ltd and others), supra note 28.
222. INEOS Köln GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-572/16, CJEU (Feb.
22, 2018).
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can be embedded in less favorable outcomes for plaintiffs. An
example for the latter situation is Juliana v. United States, where
the US District Court noted “the gravity of the plaintiffs’
evidence” and found that the substantive constitutional right to a
“climate system capable of sustaining human life” existed when
analyzing redressability.223 As the latest development in that case,
a petition for was filed by the plaintiffs for a writ of certiorari on
Feb. 17, 2021.224 Similarly, while the first German Climate Case
was unsuccessful due to a lack of specific legal interest
(Klagebefugnis) of the plaintiffs—a procedural requirement
under the Code of Administrative Court Procedure—the Berlin
Administrative Court nevertheless held that the claim as such was
justiciable and that the government could not claim that the case
concerned a non-justiciable core of “executive sole responsibility”
(Kernbereich exekutiver Eigenverantwortung).225 Furthermore,
the Berlin Administrative Court found that the protection of
fundamental rights as guaranteed in the German Basic Law would
require
the
Federal
government
to
observe
the
“Untermassverbot” which defines the minimum standard of
rights protection that the State must observe when adopting
measures to protect the climate, despite having a margin of
appreciation.226 In other words, while the State enjoys a margin of
appreciation when adopting measure to protect fundamental
rights, this excludes measures that would undermine or undercut
223. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1173 (9th Cir. 2020). In Juliana v.
United States, the court confirmed that “[t]he plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are caused by
carbon emissions from fossil fuel production, extraction, and transportation. A
significant portion of those emissions occur in this country; the United States accounted
for over 25% of worldwide emissions from 1850 to 2012, and currently accounts for about
15%.” Id. It also found that “federal subsidies and leases have increased those emissions.”
Id. “Plaintiffs met the injury and causation requirements for Article III standing because
at least some plaintiffs had alleged concrete and particularized injuries caused by fossil
fuel carbon emissions that were increased by federal subsidies and leases.” Id. To
establish Article III redressability; the plaintiffs must show that the relief they seek is both
(1) substantially likely to redress their injuries; and (2) within the district court’s power
to award. Id. Redress need not be guaranteed, but it must be more than “merely
speculative.” See Grossman, supra note 32, at 355.
224. Mot. to Stay the Mandate Pending Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Juliana v. United States No. 18-36082 (9th Cir.).
225. VG, supra note 30, at 9-12. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [13. Federal
Constitutional Court] Nov. 22, 2001, case No. 2BvE 6/99.
226. The Berlin Administrative Court explained that a Party to the Paris Agreement
could not use the inaction of other States as an excuse for its own inaction. VG, supra
note 30, at 21-22.

892 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

this minimum standard. Lastly, while plaintiffs could not overturn
the planning permission for a new runway at Dublin Airport in
the case of the Friends of the Irish Environment v. Fingal County
Council, the ruling of the High Court of Ireland set a precedent
in finding an implied right to an environment that is:
consistent with the human dignity and well-being of citizens
at large is an essential condition for the fulfilment of all
human rights. It is an indispensable existential right that is
enjoyed universally, yet which is vested personally as a right
that presents and can be seen always to have presented, and
to enjoy protection, under Art. 40.3.1° of the Constitution.227

Victorious cases, on the other hand, may not necessarily
represent a milestone for climate change mitigation or
adaptation, yet often they spur a fresh reading of the law, thereby
unfolding a sustained influence on the legal reasoning of courts
in other jurisdictions, as well as setting a precedent for
administrative authorities.
A. Comparative Units
Hugely influential in other jurisdictions was the landmark
decision in Urgenda, where The Hague Court of Appeal upheld
The Hague District Court’s injunction ordering the Dutch State
to reduce its GHG emissions by 25% (compared to pre-industrial
levels) towards the end of 2020.228 The Hague Court of Appeal
based its decision on the State’s ‘duty of care’ in accordance with
Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR, and found that the current emission
reduction of around 17% was insufficient to mitigate the real and
imminent threat posed by climate change.229 The ruling of The
Hague Court of Appeal was confirmed by the Supreme Court of
the Netherlands.230 The Supreme Court’s reasoning was rooted in
the argument that the global nature of climate change requires
each state to do what it “necessary” to achieve the global
temperature goal.231 The Supreme Court also acknowledged that
227. Friends of the Irish Environment, supra note 58.
228. Hof’s-Gravenhage 9 oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. GA van der Sheen,
Ch.W. Backes (Staat der Nederlanden/Stitchting Urgenda) (Neth.) [hereinafter
Urgenda Court of Appeal].
229. Id. paras. 71-75.
230. Urgenda Supreme Court, supra note 22.
231. Id. paras. 5.6.1-5.8.
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“States will have to agree among themselves on their respective
individual share in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and make
the necessary choices and considerations in this regard.”232 While
such agreements existed in the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement, the Supreme Court found that these remained only
general at that level. However, the Court explained that these
general obligations and principles entailed that “a fair
distribution must take place, taking into account the
responsibility and state of development of the individual
countries.”233
Concretizing these obligations in the Dutch constitutional
system would fall into the political domain, subject to
parliamentary oversight. However, according to the Supreme
Court, that general allocation of responsibilities does not restrain
that:
the courts can assess whether the measures taken by the State
are too little in view of what is clearly the lower limit of its
share in the measures to be taken worldwide against
dangerous climate change. It is clear, for example . . . that
the State cannot at any rate do nothing at all and that the
courts can rule that the State is in breach of its obligation . . .
if it does nothing.234

For the definition of the required necessary action, the
Supreme Court referred to the consensus in an international
context about the distribution of measures.235 The courts can
then establish “what—in accordance with the widely supported
view of States and international organisations, which view is also
based on the insights of climate science—can in any case be
regarded as the State’s minimum fair share.”236
This judicial function to review if the State is doing its
minimum share was also grounded in the right
to effective legal protection under Article 13 of the ECHR.237
232. Id. para. 6.2.
233. Id.
234. Id. para. 6.3.
235. Id. paras. 6.3, 7.5.1. The Court emphasized that in respect to the State’s
positive obligations to take measures to prevent climate change pursuant to Articles 2
and 8 of the ECHR, the 25% reduction target was an absolute minimum. Id. para. 7.5.1.
236. Id.
237. Id. paras. 5.5.1-5.5.3. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 71.
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Crucially, the Supreme Court held that the State must
“properly substantiate that the policy it pursues
meets
the
requirements to be imposed, i.e., that it pursues a policy through
which it remains above the lower limit of its fair share.”238 Thus,
the Supreme Court found that both the international
commitments of the State and the scientific evidence available
would not only bind the State’s domestic decision-making when
defining what was necessary to do “its fair share,” but also mark
the line between political discretion and justiciability, where
courts can scrutinize if the State remains above the lower
threshold when defining its fair share.
Urgenda played a significant role even before it was
confirmed by the Supreme Court. The ruling at first instance was
extensively cited in New Zealand’s leading climate case, Thomson
v. The Minister for Climate Change Issues.239 In Thomson, the
contested issues were whether New Zealand’s 2050 target set
under domestic legislation had to be reviewed by the government
following updated international scientific consensus on climate
change, and whether the 2030 target was amenable to judicial
review despite not being required under domestic legislation.240
The High Court found that the government was granted
discretionary power to review the 2050 climate target pursuant to
the Climate Change Response Act.241 However, this statutory
discretionary power is to be exercised “in accordance with its
purpose” and consistently with New Zealand’s international
obligations.242 The purpose of the Act is to enable New Zealand
to meet its international obligations under the UNFCCC.243 The
High Court held “the Paris Agreement has been entered into in
“pursuit of” the Convention’s objective and guided by its
principles.”244 Furthermore, the High Court found that the
Minister was required to review the target in the light of scientific
238. Urgenda Supreme Court, supra note 22, para. 6.5.
239. Thomson, supra note 23 (giving the Urgenda case detailed consideration).
240. Id. paras. 6, 7; Maria L. Banda, Climate Science in the Courts A Review of U.S. and
International Judicial Pronouncements, ENV’T L. INST. 105 (2020).
241. Climate Change Response Act 2002, No. 40 (N.Z.).
242. Thomson, supra note 23, para. 88.
243. Climate Change Response Act 2002, No. 40 (N.Z.). This Act has since been
amended several times to give effect to international obligations, the purpose is defined
in section 3(1)(aa), (a).
244. Thomson, supra note 23, para. 88.
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changes that occurred between the IPCC Assessment Reports,
however, the requirement of “this cause of action has been
overtaken by subsequent events” given that the new government
had announced to set a new 2050 target while the case was
pending.245
By contrast, the 2030 target also considered in Thomson, was
not set by the government under domestic legislation, but rather
in direct response to the obligation under the Paris Agreement to
submit the State’s nationally determined contribution
(“NDC”).246 The Court’s jurisdiction to review the NDC decision
which set the 2030 target arose from the common law, pursuant
to which the exercise of a public power by the executive having
important public consequences is potentially amendable to
review.247 Notably, in this context, the Court considered how
other courts reviewed their governments’ action or inaction
under the Paris Agreement.248 Based on its assessment of foreign
judicial pronouncements, including the District Court’s ruling in
Urgenda,249 the Court concluded that “it may be appropriate for
domestic courts to play a role in Government decision making
about climate change policy.”250
The High Court especially found that:
The courts have not considered the entire subject matter is a
“no go” area, whether because the state had entered into
international obligations, or because the problem is a global
one and one country’s efforts alone cannot prevent harm to
that country’s people and their environment, or because the
Government’s response involves the weighing of social,
economic and political factors, or because of the complexity
of the science. The courts have recognised the significance of
the issue for the planet and its inhabitants and that those
within the court’s jurisdiction are necessarily amongst all who
are affected by inadequate efforts to respond to climate
change. The various domestic courts have held that they have

245. Id. para. 178.
246. Id. para. 101.
247. Id. para. 101.
248. Id. para. 105.
249. Thomson was decided in 2017, before the judgments of the Hague Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court in Urgenda. Thomson, supra note 23; Urgenda Court of
Appeal, supra note 228.
250. Thomson, supra note 23, para. 133.

896 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

a proper role to play in Government decision making on this
topic, while emphasising that there are constitutional limits
in how far that role may extend. The IPCC reports provide a
factual basis on which decisions can be made. Remedies are
fashioned to ensure appropriate action is taken while leaving
the policy choices about the content of that action to the
appropriate state body.251

Consequently, the High Court concluded that the
importance of climate change warranted some scrutiny of the
executive through the judiciary.252 Such scrutiny was recognized
by various other courts, while acknowledging that if a weighing of
public policies was required, constitutional grounds required the
Court to refer the matter back to elected powers.253 It then found
that the NDC was not based on a ministerial error and thus not
outside the power of the executive, and that the international
framework had been followed.254
Thus, the High Court in Thomson cited decisions of foreign
judiciaries to support its exercise of judicial review under the
common law, and to reject the argument that climate change was
foreign policy and therefore beyond the reach of the judiciary.
Conversely, in the same way as in other areas where deference to
the executive branch is the alternative course of action, the Court
reserved the right to review the decision of the government within
constitutional limits. This clarifies that judicial review of
governmental decision-making in the climate change context
follows the same rules as in other important policy areas, and that
ministerial errors in the decision-making process as well as the
non-application of the international legal framework, are flaws
that judicial review can identify.
This scrutiny of courts extends to the application of national
planning law in the climate change context in cases where
planned projects will lead to further emissions. Gloucester
concerned the Minister of Planning’s rejection of an open cut
coal mine in the Gloucester Valley in Australia. The mining
company, Gloucester Resources Limited, appealed the rejection
to the Land and Environmental Court (LEC) of New South Wales
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
Id. para. 134.
Id.
Id. para. 179.
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(“NSW”).255 The appeal was dismissed due to the direct and
indirect impacts the mine would have on the local environment
and the global climate through GHG emissions,256 and thorough
consideration was given to the reasoning of The Hague District
Court and The Hague Court of Appeal in Urgenda.257
The LEC found that all GHG emissions must be taken into
account, including from the combustion of produced coal by
consumers.258 This decision was based on the environmental
impacts of the mine and the public interests.259 Furthermore, the
LEC emphasized that all GHG emissions would contribute to
climate change, no matter where the combustion was taking
place.260 In this context, the Court strengthened its argument by
reference not only to Australian case law, but turned to the US
Supreme Court261 and the decision in Urgenda, underlining that:
many courts have recognised this point that climate change
is caused by cumulative emissions from a myriad of individual
sources, each proportionally small relative to the global total
of GHG emissions, and will be solved by abatement of the
GHG emissions from these myriad of individual sources.262

The LEC admitted that neither the Paris Agreement nor
Australia’s NDCs prescribed how the State must act in order to
reduce its emissions or prohibit new fossil fuel projects.263
However, the Court stressed that limitations for national
emissions would flow from the global temperature goal264 and
held that “there is a causal link between the project’s cumulative

255. Gloucester, supra note 24, paras. 1-8.
256. Id. paras. 8, 686-99.
257. Gloucester was decided before the Supreme Court confirmed the previous
instances.
258. Gloucester, supra note 24, paras. 486-513.
259. Id. para. 513. For a discussion of the crucial role of EIAs and the inclusion of
scope 3 emissions, see Brian J. Preston, Contemporary Issues in Environmental Impact
Assessment, 37 ENV’T & PLAN. L. J., 423 (2020).
260. Gloucester, supra note 24, para. 515.
261. Massachusetts v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Elizabeth Fisher,
Climate Change Litigation, Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to
Massachusetts v. EPA, 35 L. & POL. 236, 239 (2013). For a thorough analysis of the ruling
and its lasting legacy, see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE RULE OF FIVE: MAKING CLIMATE
HISTORY AT THE SUPREME COURT (2020).
262. Gloucester, supra note 24, para. 516.
263. Id. paras. 525-526.
264. Id. para. 527.
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GHG emissions and climate change and its consequences.”265 The
LEC explained in respect of the obligations under the UNFCCC
and the Paris Agreement that:
the exploitation and burning of a new fossil fuel reserve,
which will increase GHG emissions, cannot assist in achieving
the rapid and deep reductions in GHG emissions that are
necessary in order to achieve the objectives set out in Article
4.1 and 2.1 (a) of the Paris Agreement.266

The LEC also relied on scientific reports explaining that most
fossil fuel resources must be left in the ground in order to stay
within the carbon budget;267 a stance that has been welcomed.268
Similar to Urgenda, Gloucester thus established that the Paris
Agreement sets forth an objective climate change standard based
on the global temperature goal, in the context of the overarching
objective of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement to reduce
emissions. This global temperature goal articulates the
overarching object and purpose of both treaties,269 and it can be
operationalized when it is coupled with the scientific evidence on
“safe” emissions levels that define the carbon budget that allows
to keeping the temperature below 2 °C. The Australian State’s
actions—the Ministry of Planning’s rejection of the proposed
mining project—was then measured against this standard. Even
though the LEC did not award the Paris Agreement with direct
legal effect, the “rapid and deep” reductions in GHG emissions,
required by the Agreement’s temperature goal in particular,
established an objective to which the State’s actions must
correspond.270
The decision in Gloucester has already set a precedent and
ensued a wider impact on subsequent planning decisions. In
August 2019, the Independent Planning Commission denied a
265. Id. para. 525.
266. Id. para. 527.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Lesley Hughes, The Rocky Hill Decision: A Watershed for Climate Change
Action?, 37 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 341, 351 (2019) (“By placing an understanding of
the rapidly dwindling carbon budget at the core of the argument against the mine, it
would seem that the law, at least in this case, has caught up with the scientific
understanding of global climate change.”).
269. In the context of treaty purposes pursuant to the Vienna Convention. Vienna
Convention, supra note 199, art. 31(1).
270. Gloucester, supra note 24, para. 527.
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five-year extension to the Dartbrook Coal Mine based on climate
change considerations in line with the LEC’s decision in
Gloucester.271 However, it should be noted that the applicant filed
appeal on the merits to the LEC in August 2020.272 A month after
the Independent Planning Commission’s decision on the coal
mine in Dartbrook, approval for another large coal mine in the
Bylong Coal Project was also rejected, based on the reasoning in
Gloucester.273 The Independent Planning Commission explicitly
agreed with the LEC that all GHG emissions, including scope-3
emissions, will adversely impact the environment in New South
Wales and not assist in achieving the global temperature goal of
the Paris Agreement.274 Furthermore, the Independent Planning
Commission concluded that the project was not in the public
interest because it interfered with the principle of
intergenerational equity. The predicted economic benefits would
accrue to the present generation while “the long-term
environmental, heritage and agricultural costs will be borne by
the future generation.”275
The significance of the reference to Urgenda in Gloucester can
hardly be over-estimated. Courts in both instances faced the

271. Statement of reasons for Decision: Dartbrook Coal Mine - Modification 7, NEW SOUTH
WALES GOV. INDEP. PLAN. COMM’N, DA231-7-2000 MOD7 at para. 129, (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.ipcn.nsw.gov.au/resources/pac/media/files/pac/projects/2019/02/dart
brook-coal-mine-modification-7/determination/dartbrook-coal-mine-mod-7—
statement-of-reasons-for-decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TAN-YRGD].
272. Merits Appeal Proceedings in NSW Land and Environment Court, NEW SOUTH
WALES
GOV.
INDEP.
PLAN.
COMM’N
(Aug.
19,
2020),
https://www.ipcn.nsw.gov.au/resources/pac/media/files/pac/projects/2019/02/dart
brook-coal-mine-modification-7/merits-appeal/statement-from-theipc/200904dartbrook-appeal.pdf [https://perma.cc/NWG7-B7K3].
273. Statement of reasons for Decision: Bylong Coal Project, NEW SOUTH WALES GOV.
INDEP.
PLAN.
COMM’N,
SSD
6367
(2019),
https://www.ipcn.nsw.gov.au/resources/pac/media/files/pac/projects/2018/10/bylo
ng-coal-project/determination/bylong-coal-project-ssd-6367—statement-of-reasons-fordecision.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YUZ-5RNB]. The Commission went on to
acknowledge that:
NSW is currently in a transition away from the use of fossil fuels as an energy
source. In that context, the Commission is of the view that the cumulative
environmental impact of the Project and Recommended Revised Project needs
to be considered when weighing the acceptability of GHG emissions associated
with the mine. The Commission agrees with Preston CJ at [555] in Glouster . . .
Id. at 692.
274. Id. para. 690.
275. Id. paras. 806, 817.
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challenge of applying international commitments to national
decisions; one at the level of reviewing the adequacy of a national
climate target and one in planning law. Neither of them used the
Paris Agreement as a directly applicable legal source, however,
the courts agreed that the global temperature goal together with
the obligations under the Paris Agreement, set a justiciable,
objective standard against which inner-state decisions at different
levels of governance are to be measured.276 This standard entails
that the State defines and fulfils its fair share, which includes
pursuing policies and prioritizing courses of action that reduce
GHG emissions so that the State’s contribution remains at least
above the lower threshold of its fair share.277
The importance of accounting for climate change impacts
when planning future infrastructure projects that lead to further
GHG emissions is acknowledged in states across the developed/
developing country divide, thus not restricted to Annex I
countries who are expected to take the lead in combating climate
change and its adverse effects.278 In Earthlife Johannesburg v. The
Minister for the Environment, the dispute concerned the granting
of permission for a new coal fired power plant despite the lack of
consideration of climate change impacts for the environmental
authorization under the National Environmental Management
Act (“NEMA”).279 The permission had been granted by the
Department of Environmental Affairs and confirmed by the
Minister for the Environment.280 Earthlife Johannesburg appealed
on the grounds that under Article 240 NEMA all relevant factors
had to be taken into account in the EIA and that the failure to
include climate change impacts invalidated the permission.281
It is noteworthy that the High Court of South Africa stated
that the absence of an explicit provision in the statute requiring

276. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda, supra note 22, paras. 6.3., 7.5.1; Gloucester,
supra note 24, paras. 252-527.
277. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda, supra note 22, para. 6.5.
278. UNFCCC, supra note 6, arts. 3(1), 4(2)(a); Paris Agreement, supra note 3,
Preamble, arts. 4(4), 9(3).
279. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, (S. Afr.).
280. Earthlife Johannesburg, supra note 25, para. 2.
281. Id. para. 12 (“Earthlife’s case centers on the proposition that section 240(1)
of NEMA, properly interpreted, requires, as a mandatory pre-requisite, a climate change
impact assessment to be conducted and considered before the grant of an environmental
authorisation.”).
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a climate change impact assessment did not mean that there was
no legal duty of the authorities to consider climate change
impacts of the proposed project.282 In fact, the Court explained
that whether or not such a legal duty existed was an interpretative
question in administrative law.283 The High Court found that
Article 240 NEMA had to be interpreted “purposively and
consistently” with the constitutional right to a clean
environment284 protected in Article 24 of the Constitution of
South Africa285 and “consistently with international law.”286 The
Court specifically mentioned the various international
agreements on climate change, the “precautionary principle”
under Article 3(3) UNFCCC and the “obligation on all state
parties to take climate change considerations into account their
relevant environmental policies and actions, . . . that arises from
Article 4(1)(f) UNFCCC.”287 Only a formal report that
considered the climate change impacts from the coal fired power
plant would fulfil the evidentiary requirements of the
authorization process. The High Court of South Africa chose to
remit the case back to the Minister for the Environment to
consider the climate change impacts as part of the administrative
appeal procedure.288
In a similar fashion, in Save Lamu et al. v. National
Environmental Management Authority and Amu Power Co. Ltd., the
National Environment Tribunal of Kenya set aside the
Environmental Impact Assessment License289 issued by the
National Environmental Management Authority. The Tribunal
stated that the EIA failed to consider the project’s climate impacts
and that NEMA had not carried out effective public participation
282. Id. para. 88.
283. Id. para. 88.
284. Id. para. 80. See also id. para. 82.
285. S. AFR. CONST. art. 24, 1996.
286. Earthlife Johannesburg, supra note 25, para. 83 (invoking section 233 of the
Constitution which demands that any court must give effect to any reasonable
interpretation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation
that is not consistent with international law.).
287. Id.
288. Id. para. 121.
289. Environmental Impact Assessment License, NAT’L ENV’T MGMT. AUTH., No.
NEMA/EIA/PSL/3798
(Sept.
7,
2016),
https://s3-ap-southeast1.amazonaws.com/amupower/ESIA/Nema+Amu+Power+EIA+license.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ULJ-SAP8].
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in planning this first coal-fired power plant in Kenya.290 The
National Environment Tribunal defined the purpose of the EIA
in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals291 was to
“assist a country in attaining sustainable development when
commissioning projects.”292
The National Environment Tribunal made extensive
reference to case law from other jurisdictions. It concluded from
its analysis of the case law, international law, and comparative law,
that public participation in the present case was required.293
Furthermore, the National Environment Tribunal found that the
EIA was flawed because it did not comply with all relevant national
laws and reasoned that since “climate change issues are pertinent
in projects of this nature,” consideration of, and compliance with,
all laws relating to climate change was necessary.294
Having thus found that the process was flawed, the National
Environment Tribunal addressed the consequences of such
failure. Again, the Tribunal explicitly stated that it was necessary
to “draw judicial support” from other courts,295 before coming to
the conclusion that the flaws were sufficiently serious to invalidate
the EIA.296 According to the World Bank criteria,297 South Africa

290. Save Lamu, supra note 26, para. 151.
291. For more information, see Take Action for the Sustainable Development Goals,
U.N.,
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
[https://perma.cc/U2KY-5UH4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
292. Save Lamu, supra note 26, para. 16 (“The purpose of the Environment Impact
Assessment (EIA) process is to assist a country in attaining sustainable development when
commissioning projects. The United Nations has set Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), which are an urgent call for action by all countries recognizing that ending
poverty and other deprivations must go hand-in-hand with strategies that improve health
and education, reduce inequality, and spur economic growth – all while tackling climate
change and working to preserve our oceans and forests.”).
293. The National Environment Tribunal quoted the analysis conducted by the
Constitutional Court of Kenya. Save Lamu, supra note 26, paras. 25, 26. See also
Constitutional Petition No. 305 of 2012, Mui Coal Basin Local Community & 15 others v.
Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 17 others (2017) e.K.L.R. (Kenya).
294. Save Lamu, supra note 26, para. 138.
295. Id. para. 76.
296. Id. para. 77.
297. For the current 2021 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those
with a GNI per capita of $1,035 or less in 2019; lower middle-income economies are those
with a GNI per capita between $1,036 and $4,045; upper middle-income economies are
those with a GNI per capita between $4,046 and $12,535; high-income economies are
those with a GNI per capita of $12,536 or more. See World Bank County and Lending Groups,
supra note 29.
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is an upper middle-income economy and Kenya is a lower middleincome economy and yet the High Court of South Africa and the
National Environment Tribunal of Kenya agreed that climate
change considerations were too important to be ignored when
planning individual projects which would result in additional
GHG emissions, despite various socio-economic interests at
stake.298 In particular, the National Environment Tribunal of
Kenya effectively reconciled development and economic progress
within the notion of the SDGs.299
The importance of considering climate change impacts and
the use of the precautionary principle300 in the planning process
is apparent in the recent decision of the UK Court of Appeal
concerning the expansion of the Heathrow Airport.301 The case
centered on the question whether the Secretary of State had given
sufficient consideration to climate change as required under the
Planning Act in section 5(8).302 The UK Court of Appeal
298. See, e.g., Earthlife Johannesburg, supra note 25, para. 82; Save Lamu v. National
Environmental Management Authority (2016), case No. NEMA/ESIA /PSL/3798
(Kenya), para. 89.
299. Save Lamu, supra note 26, para. 16. See also supra note 292 (citing excerpt from
the decision regarding SDGs).
300. Rep. of the United Nations U.N. Conference on Environmental Development,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I)
(1992). Principle 15 states, “[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.” Id. at 3. See also UNFCCC, supra note 6, art. 3(3); Meinhard Schroeder,
Precautionary Approach/Principle, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
(2014),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e1603?rskey=eIP1vb&result=1&prd=MPIL [https://perma.cc/5WJ6-LWZR].
301. R. (on the application of Plan B Earth Ltd.), supra note 27.
302. Planning Act 2008, c. 29 (UK) § 5 (2008):
(1) The Secretary of State may designate a statement as a national policy
statement for the purposes of this Act if the statement—
(a)is issued by the Secretary of State, and
(b)sets out national policy in relation to one or more specified
descriptions of development.
(2)In this Act “national policy statement” means a statement designated
under subsection (1) as a national policy statement for the purposes of
this Act.
...
(8)The reasons must (in particular) include an explanation of how the
policy set out in the statement takes account of Government policy
relating to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change.
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understood the provision to be wider than legislation and
adhered to a literal interpretation.303 On that basis, it criticized
the decision of the Secretary of State for not taking the Paris
Agreement into account as a “fundamentally wrong turn in the
whole process.”304 The Court found that even if the Secretary of
State exercised his discretion as to whether or not to consider the
Paris Agreement when making the planning decision on the third
runway:
the only reasonable view open to him was that the Paris
Agreement was so obviously material that it had to be taken
into account. It is well established in public law that there are
some considerations that must be taken into account, some
considerations that must not be taken into account and a
third category, considerations that may be taken into account
in the discretion of the decision-maker . . . there can be some
unincorporated international obligations that are “so
obviously material” that they must be taken into account. The
Paris Agreement fell into this category.305

Notably, the Court of Appeal quoted the precautionary
principle as expressed in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration306
when explaining which GHG emissions would need to be taken
into account.307 This part was a reply to the argument of the
government that scientific uncertainty remained as to the amount
of expected CO2 and non- CO2 emissions. The Court found that:
the fact that there would be non- CO2 effects was
acknowledged and it was recognized that they would be more
than twice the CO2 effects. In line with the precautionary
principle, and as common sense might suggest, scientific
uncertainty is not a reason for not taking something into

303. R. (on the application of Plan B Earth Ltd.), supra note 27, para. 224 (“Next it is
important to appreciate that the words “Government policy” are words of the ordinary
English language. They do not have any specific technical meaning. They should be
applied in their ordinary sense to the facts of a given situation. In particular, we can find
no warrant in the legislation for limiting the phrase “Government policy” to mean only
the legal requirements of the Climate Change Act. The concept of policy is necessarily
broader than legislation.”).
304. Id. para. 276.
305. Id. para. 237.
306. See U.N. Conference on Environmental Development, supra note 300.
307. R. (on the application of Plan B Earth Ltd.), supra note 27, para. 259.
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account at all, even if it cannot be precisely quantified at that
stage.308

The Court also stated that:
This is one of those cases in which it would be right for this
court to grant a remedy on grounds of ‘exceptional public
interest.’ The nature and degree of that public interest hardly
needs to be set out here. The legal issues are of the highest
importance . . . . The issue of climate change is a matter of
profound national and international importance of great
concern to the public—and, indeed, to the Government of
the United Kingdom and many other national governments,
as is demonstrated by their commitment to the Paris
Agreement. 309

The Court of Appeal granted relief through declaring the
designation decision as unlawful.310 The failure to consider the
Paris Agreement in the light of the government’s own firm policy
commitments on climate change under the Agreement thus
invalidated the planning decision. The Court stated that this
would not pre-determine that the Secretary of State was obliged
to reach any particular outcome.311
The UK Supreme Court overturned the decision, it
disagreed with the Court of Appeal in its interpretation of the
meaning of “Government policy” in section 5(8) of the PA
2008.312 It replaced the Court of Appeal’s interpretation with a
“purposive interpretation,” and stated:
The purpose of the provision is to make sure that there is a
degree of coherence between the policy set out in the NPS
and established Government policies relating to the
mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. The section
speaks of “Government policy”, which points toward a policy
which has been cleared by the relevant departments on a
government-wide basis.313

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. para. 258.
Id. para. 277.
Id. para. 280.
Id. para. 238.
Heathrow, supra note 28. The analysis begins at paragraph 101.
Id. para. 105.
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Government set
its national climate targets in response to the Paris Agreement.314
However, “Government Policy” within the meaning of the PA
2008 only included a formal written statement of established
policy.315 The Court observed that “although the point had been
a matter of contention in the courts below, no party sought to
argue before this court that a ratified international treaty which
had not been implemented in domestic law fell within the
statutory phrase ‘Government policy.’”316 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court addressed the role of ratification for
“Government Policy:”
The fact that the United Kingdom had ratified the Paris
Agreement is not of itself a statement of Government policy
in the requisite sense. Ratification is an act on the
international plane. It gives rise to obligations of the United
Kingdom in international law which continue whether or not
a particular government remains in office and which, as
treaty obligations, “are not part of UK law and give rise to no
legal rights or obligations in domestic law.317

On that basis, the Court concluded that the “Government’s
approach on how to adapt its domestic policies to contribute to
the global goals of the Paris Agreement was still in a process of
development” and that “the Paris Agreement itself is not
Government Policy.”318 This statement is surprising and may have
been derived from a strict understanding of the dualist doctrine
for the relationship between national and international law319 that
was implied in the reasoning of the Supreme Court.320 However,
314. Id. para. 97.
315. Id. para. 106.
316. Id. para. 108.
317. Id.
318. Id. paras. 111, 112.
319. For the different doctrines of monism and dualism, see Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
(2011),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e1056?rskey=0rkfiW&result=2&prd=MPIL [https://perma.cc/5F29-5HS3].
320. Heathrow, supra note 28 para. 108 (“Ratification does not constitute a
commitment operating on the plane of domestic law to perform obligations under the
treaty. Moreover, it cannot be regarded in itself as a statement devoid of relevant
qualification for the purposes of domestic law, since if treaty obligations are to be given
effect in domestic law that will require law-making steps which are uncertain and
unspecified at the time of ratification.”)
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denying the Paris Agreement any qualification as government
Policy is not easily reconciled with the view of the Court that the
national climate policies are developed in line with the
international commitments. Even if, under the United Kingdom’s
dualist approach to international law, the Paris Agreement does
not provide directly applicable legal obligations at the level of
domestic law, it is not compelling to also refuse that it could
qualify as “Government Policy.” Doing so risks conflating legal
obligations (that cannot arise directly from the Paris Agreement
in UK domestic law without a further act of Parliament) with
shaping “Government Policy” in the sense of Article 5(8) PA 2008
through the commitment that ratification of an international
treaty entails. The decision underpins the importance of
designing domestic planning laws so that they can account for
climate protection commitments made by states at the
international level.
As part of the overall analysis of the case law discussed here,
the UK Supreme Court decision may serve best to buttress the
argument that some legal developments resulting from litigation
can be rather short-lived, and that they are not following a linear
trajectory in terms of translating climate commitments of
governments into justiciable standards to scrutinize the climate
impacts of major infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the cases
that were considered in this Section demonstrate the extent to
which courts utilize their State’s international climate protection
commitments when assessing compliance of national decisions,
even though these international commitments fall short of
spelling out individual states’ GHG emissions reduction targets.
Some courts are more inclined than others to give effect to the
international obligations and the temperature goal under the
climate change regime, whether this concerns reviewing a
country’s GHG emission reduction target at national level or
administrative decisions in planning law. Moreover, the
precautionary principle is invoked in some instances to overcome
remaining uncertainties pertinent to scientific evidence.321
321. See Save Lamu, supra note 26, para. 139; see also R. (on the application of Plan B
Earth Ltd.), supra note 27, paras. 258-60 (making reference to the established case law of
the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot
Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v.
Staatssecretaris Van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 2004 E.C.R. I-07405).
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However, while there is an increasing trend in some of the
judgments to engage with foreign judicial pronouncements, the
picture remains fragmented, especially in the light of the younger
judgments that originate in the Global North. In this situation, it
becomes even more important to stress the significance of the
“small and subtle” legal developments, such as the view held by
the Borgarting Court of Appeal and confirmed by the Norwegian
Supreme Court that extraterritorial emissions must be included
in the wider scope of the right to a healthy environment. One may
even have to be content with the fact that there is an intrajurisdictional judicial discourse as to whether the Paris
Agreement qualifies as “Government Policy.”
In all these cases, the scope of judicial review was defined
through country-specific constitutional and legal frameworks.
Some courts then used the decisions of other courts to strengthen
their positions when facing governments and administrative
authorities whose climate policy and planning decisions
undermined their international climate commitments—
especially those arising from the Paris Agreement. This approach
is particularly important in a situation where no further
administrative control is available to rectify the identified legal
flaws, or where courts reject their governments’ own
interpretation of relevant international climate commitments.
The presumed risk that no-one else will follow is certainly
diminished in the light of some of the here-discussed decisions,
in situations where explicit reference is made to preceding
judicial pronouncements.
B. The Analytical and Transferrable Argument
None of these cases contend that the UNFCCC or the Paris
Agreement themselves should serve as the legal basis of a claim
directly. Conversely, the provisions used as legal basis for these
claims are enshrined in constitutional or statutory law. However,
the case law demonstrates that some courts accept the Paris
Agreement as an international treaty that articulates a standard
against which national decisions at different levels of governance
are to be examined. This standard is defined by the global
temperature goal and the international obligations of the Paris
Agreement, as well as the wider normative context of the climate
change regime. The national decisions analyzed in this Article
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comprise of setting stringent national GHG emission reduction
targets and evaluating planning decisions in the light of their
climate impacts.
Two claims can be derived from the discussed case law. First,
the internationally agreed global temperature goal forms part of
an inter-state promise.322 This goal is firmly based on climate
science and is vital to avoid the most serious climate change
consequences.323 It translates scientific knowledge related to the
increase of severity and frequency of climate impacts—which is
directly proportional to the increase of GHG emissions globally—
324 and incorporates it into a legally binding international
agreement. Therein lies the legal nature of this temperature goal;
while no state can be held solely responsible for achieving it, every
state’s consent to the Paris Agreement represents a legally
binding commitment to the temperature goal. States have made
a mutual inter-state promise at the international level to achieve
the goal as an international community and individual
commitments at the national level flow from this promise.
Holding the temperature below 2 °C or even closer to 1.5 °C can
only be achieved through ambitious domestic action and this
action is unconditional in accordance with the wording of the
Paris Agreement. It is not dependent on spelling out concrete
individual reduction targets for each Party at the international
level. Thereby, the Agreement defines an objective standard
against which states’ actions, including their demonstrated
ambition, can be measured,325 as seen in Urgenda and Thomson.
The fact that compliance with the commitment to pursue

322. For a discussion of interactional sources of environmental law, see Jutta
Brunnée, The Sources of International Environmental Law: Interactional Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 960 (Samantha Besson & Jean
d’Aspremont eds., 2017).
323. Watts et al., supra note 31, at 1836; IPCC 2018, supra note 47, at A.3; IPCC,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT v (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2015),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf/
[https://perma.cc/96SM-JZVE]; The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda, supra note 22.
paras. 4.1-4.8.
324. See IPCC 2018, supra note 47. See also WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., GLOBAL
ANNUAL TO DECADAL CLIMATE UPDATE TARGET YEARS: 2020 AND 2020-2024 (2020),
https://hadleyserver.metoffice.gov.uk/wmolc/WMO_GADCU_2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3R6A-7ZKL].
325. This view corresponds to the rule of law in addressing climate change. See
Brunnée, supra note 322, at 964-969.
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ambitions national reduction efforts is not sanctioned through a
legal mechanism per se is irrelevant for the legal nature of this
temperature goal. Legal force does not require penalizing noncompliance and adherence to rules is not only driven by effective
sanctioning.326
Second, by committing to this international standard, states
have reduced their political margin of appreciation, through an
act of sovereign external decision-making which was subsequently
endorsed by national parliaments. The inter-state promise of
achieving the temperature goal becomes a state-individual
promise, through approval in domestic ratification avenues.
Consequently, the temperature target is not only an objective
standard but also a guarantee of protection for the individual
against adverse effects of climate change that will occur if the
temperature goal is exceeded. It thereby becomes a rights-based
standard. Meeting the temperature target through their best
efforts is thus a duty the government not only owes to other states,
but also to the individual, as consequence of the ratification of
the Paris Agreement and the democratic endorsement that the
ratification process entails
This international commitment reduces the margin of
appreciation and thus allows for judicial review of governmental
decisions, which is notably different from making decisions on
behalf of the government or the authorities. Decisions on climate
protection have already been made by the executive branch of
government and pledges must be fulfilled at the national level.
However, the fact that domestic decisions can have consequences
for the likelihood with which the temperature goal can be
accomplished not only allows, but calls for the courts’ scrutiny,
especially with a view to the subjective rights dimension of this
goal. The qualification of the expected GHG emissions as
territorial or extraterritorial is not decisive. The link to the
responsibility of the State is established by the fact that it can

326. Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599,
2601 (1997); Benedikt Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing
Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345, 352 (1998); Richard B. Bilder,
Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE. THE
ROLE OF NON- BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 65 (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000); Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in and with International Politics: The
Functions of International Law in International Society, 14 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 105, 118 (2003).
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control its own decisions and that it must account for their
climate change impact in the light of its constitutional law and its
international commitments.
The line of argument that flows from these two claims could
be transferred to other jurisdictions in a similar fashion, however,
this Article concentrates in the following on Norway. The
Norwegian courts must be able to assess whether there has been
a violation of the constitutional right and to determine what it
takes to comply with the right to ensure a healthy environment,
while leaving the government the freedom to decide how to
comply with its duty. If statutory law does not include a provision
that requires an EIA to account for all climate impacts of the
proposed project, the constitutional right can only be effectively
protected at the level of norm application. This demands that the
legal provisions are interpreted in conformity with the
constitution. The alternative to this would be to legislate so that
the constitutional requirement of a comprehensive risk analysis
that includes all emissions becomes enshrined at the level of
administrative law as well.
The decision to allow and invest in new petroleum activity in
the Barents Sea will contribute to further GHG emissions and
thus, climate change. It will therefore not assist in “achieving the
rapid and deep reductions necessary” in order to “reach a global
peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible” and the
temperature target set out in the Paris Agreement,327 which is
grounded in Article 2 of the UNFCCC. Nor will it further the
main objective to stabilize the concentration of GHG in the
atmosphere to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.328 In Greenpeace Nordic the Borgarting
Court of Appeal held that a gradual reduction of emissions would
provide room for some emissions, even in a low-emissions
society.329 This led the Court to conclude that the decision to
select which emissions should be prioritized would be beyond its
power.330 This reasoning is based on the premise that the right to
a healthy environment is currently well protected and that

327.
328.
329.
330.

Gloucester, supra note 24, para. 527; Paris Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 2, 4(1).
UNFCCC, supra note 6, art. 2.
Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 27-28.
Id.

912 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

prioritization of GHG emissions can safely occur in a lowemissions society.331
However, even if the State had substantiated how it would
pursue its room-making policy, the argument of sufficient rights
protection could only be made if the world was indeed on track
towards a 1.5 °C target, or at least a 2 °C target. The world is not
on track to achieve the 2 °C target, even not under the most
optimistic emission scenarios.332 Consequently, it is hardly
convincing that emissions can be safely prioritized. It is also
difficult to see how emissions that add further to already too high
levels of global emissions can be aligned with the required level
of protection under Article 112, and the demand that the State
takes active measure to protect the right. The Court has missed
the opportunity to demand effective action that increases the
level of protection for the constitutional right, and instead
decided to transfer the responsibility for rights protection to the
political branch. Therefore, this reasoning entails that
Norwegians continue to live in a world that is heading towards
global warming above 3 °C, with warming in some areas, such as
the Arctic, progressing at a threefold rate greater than the world’s
average.333 While it is true that no single state can significantly
shift the temperature trajectory, the pattern where the
responsibility for action is passed on to other branches within the
State and to the international level and other states, is part of the
complexity of the challenge that climate change poses. Especially
the observed warming in the Arctic carries the potential for
catastrophic consequences, including for Northern countries.334
331. This argument relates to the statement of the Court of Appeal in Greenpeace
Nordic that a “gradual reduction of emissions in line with the 1.5-degree target will also
provide room for some emissions that may be prioritised, including in a low-emissions
society.” Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 27.
332. See IPCC 2018, supra note 47.
333. See WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION, supra note 3. See also Somini Sengupta,
Intense Arctic Wildfires Set a Pollution Record., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/climate/climate-change-arctic-fires.html
[https://perma.cc/8AQL-URNU]; Arctic Report Card: Update for 2020, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 2, https://www.arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card/Report-Card-2020
[https://perma.cc/K3VA-LS4N] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).
334. Arctic Report Card: Update for 2020, supra note 333. Furthermore, Norway’s
coastal areas will be affected by sea-level rise, for the role of international law in that
respect. See Nilufer Oral, International Law as an Adaptation Measure to Sea-level Rise and Its
Impacts on Islands and Offshore Features, 34 MARINE & COASTAL L. 415, 425 (2019). The
UN ILC decided at its seventy-first session (2019) to include the topic “Sea-level rise in
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These scientifically-predicted consequences of climate change
were the reasons for the decision of the LEC in Gloucester that all
GHG emissions contribute to further climate change impacts.335
They also underlie the finding in Save Lamu, that the United
Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals are an “urgent call for
action,” so that “contrary to popular belief the purpose of
environmental audits are not meant to hinder development but
to ensure economic progress in a country takes into account
environmental impacts of such proposed economic activity.”336
By contrast, the arguments that “room” can be created for
these additional emissions (as reasoned by the Borgarting Court
of Appeal), or that a concrete, internationally agreed-to
determination of specific quantified national emission reduction
targets must be identified prior to taking national action, or even
that others should reduce their emissions before one’s own action
can occur, are not convincing in the light of the scientific
forecasts.337 Furthermore, these arguments are not suitable to
relieve the State from its duty to protect its own people from an
encroachment on their constitutional right in a situation where
only the State can control the relevant decisions. In fact, these
arguments impliedly acknowledge what the right course of action
for the government would be, while using the global nature of the
challenge and the “drop in the ocean” argument to justify
measures that are insufficient to protect the right.
C. Addressing the Counterargument: The State’s wide Margin of
Appreciation
As demonstrated above, the courts in Greenpeace Nordic
restricted their judicial review due to the wide margin of
appreciation of the executive branch. The courts acted with
judicial self-restraint with a view to the “scientific and political”

international law” in its program of work. See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. of the work of Its
Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 326 (2018).
335. Gloucester, supra note 24, para. 514.
336. Save Lamu, supra note 26, para. 17.
337. See IPCC 2018, supra note 47. See also SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 3, para.
11. The Berlin Administrative Court used a similar argument as the Borgarting Court of
Appeal, in the first German Climate Case, when it stated that as far as it could be seen,
no other industrialized state would apply the carbon budget approach. See VG, supra note
30; see also Minnerop, supra note 30.
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character of the case.338 Climate change is a global challenge but
not an inherently foreign policy issue.339 Reviewing if a
constitutional right has been violated, remains the function of
domestic courts in the context of climate change as in other areas.
However, clarifying the “justiciable part” of the right remains a
challenging exercise. The State of the Netherlands in Urgenda
argued that questions regarding CO2 reduction were too complex
for the Court to decide on, and that the Court should refrain
from interfering with the “system of the separation of powers.”340
However, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands decided that
courts are competent to address the issue of setting a national
reduction target because climate change poses a serious, real and
immediate risk for human rights.341 It is interesting to note in this
context that General Advocate Kokott of the Court of Justice of
the European Union has argued in a similar fashion that even if
complex scientific or technical assessments are necessary, state
discretion can be limited and must be reviewed even more
intensively in cases where there are particularly serious
interferences with fundamental rights.342
For every state, political decision-making in the climate
change context requires balancing different interests, and often
entails sacrificing short-term economic benefits with longer-term
benefits that come with higher immediate costs but carry the
promise to “pay off.” The difficulty for states is that the extent to
which investments in these longer-term benefits fulfil their
338. Greenpeace Nordic Court of Appeal, supra note 17, at 27. The State’s margin of
discretion is emphasized in the preparatory works concerning the Constitutional reform
in 2014. See The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, supra note
49, at 25.
339. For a discussion to draw a distinction between international law and policy in
general, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law 1 EUR. J. INT’L. L 4, 7
(1990); see also Jutta Brunnée, Reweaving the Fabric of International Law?, in
DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 101 (Rüdiger Wolfrum &
Volker Röben eds., 2005).
340. The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda, supra note 22, para. 30.
341. Id.
paras.
5.6.1-5.6.4,
8.1-8.1.3.5.
“[T]he Netherlands is bound by the ECHR and the Dutch courts are
obliged under Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution to apply its provisions in
accordance with the interpretation of the ECtHR. The protection of human rights it pr
ovides is an essential component of a democratic state under the rule of law.” Id. para.
3.3.3.
342. Case
C-723/17,
Craeynest
v.
Brussels
Hoofdstedelijk
Gewest,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:533, para. 43.
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potential depends not only on own action, but also on the action
of other states—notably major emitters—and on the timeliness of
all of these efforts. Thus, the future success of a single state’s GHG
emission reduction policy is, to a large extent, defined by the
action of other states and the timeframe of these actions. In
contrast, the short-term benefits of a less costly climate policy,
including the use of fossil fuels, are solely controlled by each state.
The Paris Agreement, in setting forth the global temperature
target, addressed this dilemma to some degree. Nevertheless, the
Paris Agreement will only come to full fruition if domestic action
of all Parties is in line with the global goal. Ambitious national
climate protection policies and the pertinent decisions necessary
for achieving the global temperature goal at all levels of the
domestic administration—from planning law to defining a
national emissions reduction target—remain risky endeavors
insofar as, and to the extent that, the existing international law
on climate protection is not taken into account, or that action is
delayed. The full potential of ambitious climate policy decisions
will only be realized if a critical mass of states achieves equally
significant reductions within a very similar timeframe. That also
means that a state that continues to pursue policies that increase
global GHG emission levels, will do so at the cost of other states.
However, this uncertainty does not mean that courts have
neither a right nor a duty to assess, on the basis of available
scientific evidence, whether their government has violated an
objective legal standard or a constitutional right. Moreover, in
situations where governments are pursuing policies that increases
the risk of further climate change impacts and thus risk breaching
individual rights, the function of the courts is to act as guardians
of these rights. If the temperature target of the Paris Agreement
is not met, the people’s right to a healthy environment is under
extraordinary threat—this is not disputed by the Norwegian State
or its courts. The temperature goal constitutes the overarching
objective for the domestic process of balancing interests and
defines the national legal framework for judicial review, even in
the absence of internationally prescribed reduction targets.
The so defined judicial review is not equivalent with
identifying the best temperature target or prescribing a concrete
climate policy on behalf of the State. Yet it remains the courts’
function to trace the obligations which the State owes to the
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individual, regardless of whether these obligations originate in
international or national fora. It is up to the courts to evaluate
whether a measure that potentially limits the State’s capacity to
ensure effective protection of the constitutional right, has been
based on justifiable legal standards.343
The case law discussed earlier demonstrates that some courts
will trace the legal effects of their State’s international
commitments in national law and act as guardians of subjective
rights in a democratic state. It is in that function that the judiciary
is called to translate the sovereign decision made on behalf of the
people, at the international level, into national law. This role of
the courts is further supported by the ECHR, an international
human rights treaty to which Norway is a party.344 Under Article
13, the ECHR spells out the procedural guarantee of an effective
remedy.345 In Hatton v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”) referred to its earlier decision in Grady
v. the United Kingdom,346 and explained that judicial review was not
an effective remedy in cases where “the domestic courts defined
policy issues so broadly that it was not possible for the applicants
to make their Convention points regarding their rights under
Article 8 in the domestic courts.”347 Therefore, the ECtHR
emphasized that a “scope of review by domestic courts that was
limited to the classic English public-law concepts, such as
irrationality, unlawfulness and patent unreasonableness,” was too
343. Kurt Winter, The Paris Agreement: New Legal Avenues to Support a Transboundary
Harm Claim on the Basis of Climate Change, in INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PRACTICE ON
THE ENVIRONMENT 188, 188 (Christina Voigt ed., 2019); Meredith Wilensky, Climate
Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-U.S. Climate Litigation, 26 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y
F. 131, 133-34 (2015); Elisabeth Fisher & Eloise Scotford, Climate Change Adjudication:
The Need to Foster Legal Capacity: An Editorial Comment, 18 J. ENV’T. L. 3, 4 (2016). John H.
Knox has stressed that adjudication might be especially important in the absence of
regulatory action. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO THE ENJOYMENT OF A SAFE, CLEAN, HEALTHY AND
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT: FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES, UN A/HRC/37/59, para. 11 (Jan.
24, 2018).
344. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 71.
345. Id. art. 13 (“Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms
as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity”).
346. Smith v. United Kingdom, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 135-39.
347. Hatton v. the United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 611, para. 140 (2003).
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limited to comply with the requirement of Article 13 ECHR.348
Therefore, the ECtHR determined in Hatton that the scope of
review as defined by the UK Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords had been too limited and violated the right under Article
13 ECHR.349 Thus, while it is true that the State has a margin of
appreciation when choosing the right policies to protect
fundamental rights and prioritizing conflicting aspects of its
policies, this margin of discretion is narrowed with a view to the
State’s obligations under the ECHR. The procedural right to an
effective remedy reflects the ultimate limit of the State’s
discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial review requires that a legal framework exists in which
courts can evaluate claims in a reasoned manner.350 This Article
has demonstrated that such a legal framework does exist. It is
defined by international climate change law and the respective
domestic legal orders of states. The temperature goal of the Paris
Agreement forms part of a legally binding international treaty
and represents the overarching objective of national and
international climate action. This finding resonates from the
“comparative units” discussed in this Article.
Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution and the
Norwegian Petroleum Act further define the specific legal
framework by which the licensing decision for oil exploration and
production is reviewed by Norwegian courts. It is a matter for
courts to review that the statutory law is applied in accordance
with the constitutional right. The constitutional right defines the
standard for decisions taken by the authorities and the Storting as
confirmed by the Supreme Court in Greenpeace Nordic, even if the
standard for reviewing the latter’s decisions is “very high.”351
Article 112 can be used to invoke judicial review if no alternative
legal basis is available. This is confirmed by the drafting history of
Article 112 as discussed in this Article.

348. Id. paras. 141-42.
349. Id. para. 142.
350. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1239 (D. Or. 2016). See also
Thomson, supra note 23, para. 114.
351. Greenpeace Nordic Supreme Court, supra note 18, para. 142.
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As demonstrated, the Petroleum Act lacks an explicit
requirement to take climate change impacts into account during
the licensing procedure, from designating a new area for
exploration up to the point where petroleum production can
begin. This is in contrast to the finding in Greenpeace Nordic, as
confirmed by the Supreme Court, that the right to a healthy
environment protects against the consequences of all
environmental harm, including downstream emissions from
exported petroleum. The Supreme Court of Norway has
consistently held that statutory law must be applied in accordance
with the Constitution. This is again the case in the climate change
context, where the constitutional right under Article 112 must be
complied with when applying the Petroleum Act. Therefore,
prospective scope-3 emissions must be taken into account in the
EIA during the licensing procedure, at a point where the State
can still control if these additional emissions from petroleum
production can safely occur. The standard for the EIA must be
defined by the protection that Article 112 requires.
These emissions could only occur safely, if, in accordance
with the decision of the State made with the ratification of the
Paris Agreement, the global temperature increase would not
exceed 2 °C (ideally remaining closer to 1.5 °C). Only then could
the State argue that it can make room for these emissions while
at the same time claiming to protect the rights under Article 112
of the Constitution. However, the current reality is that the world
is heading towards 3 °C at the end of the century,352 it is therefore
impossible to argue that additional downstream emissions will
nevertheless protect the rights of the Norwegian people.
Not only must the statutory law be applied to give effect to
the constitutional right that is protected under Article 112, the
constitutional right must also be interpreted in light of the
international climate change regime in accordance with the
approach taken by the Norwegian Supreme Court towards
international law. Furthermore, Article 112 comprises the right
352. See IPCC 2018, supra note 47. See also UNFCCC, supra note 1, paras. 11-13. By
2025, emissions will be 2.0% higher than the 1990 level, and by 2030, emissions will be
0.7% lower than in 1990 and 0.5% lower than in 2010. Id. para. 11. “According to the SR
1.5 SR, to be consistent with pathways with no or limited overshoot of the 1.5 °C goal,
global net emissions need to decline by about 45 per cent from the 2010 level by 2030.”
Id. para. 13.
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to a healthy environment for future generations as well, even if
there is no immediate benefit for the present generation. Climate
change is a long-term challenge with consequences to be felt by
generations yet to come. However, the severity of these
consequences depends on mitigation and adaptation measures
adopted by the present generation. The State must demonstrate
that its decision-making reflects the balancing of all interests and
the full dimension of all rights within its own legal framework.
Conversely, waiting for the definition of quantified absolute
GHG emission reduction targets to be developed in international
fora, or even for a change of international accounting procedures
to include scope-3 emissions, risks an effective and timely
response and it misinterprets climate change as a matter of
inherently foreign policy. However, climate change is not even
primarily a foreign policy matter, but rather a global challenge
that demands national efforts of all branches and at all levels of
government to reduce GHG emissions. The existing international
commitments enable all states to define their fair share of
necessary national emission reductions within their own specific
legal frameworks for integrating international and national law.
The analytical argument developed here is applicable to any
domestic legal framework, and therefore can readily be
transferred to other jurisdictions.
Some courts are not only poised to review and invalidate
domestic decisions at different levels of governance because of
their wider climate chance consequences (including downstream
emissions), they are also inclined to engage in a productive interjurisdictional discourse in tackling the global challenge that
climate change poses. There may even be an emerging trend of
heeding foreign judicial pronouncements in the climate change
context more regularly when courts are used as a last resort to
enforce states’ climate commitments. In that situation, courts are
confronted with the task of safeguarding fundamental rights or
ensuring compliance with administrative rules, against their own
executive branches or administrative authorities. This judicial
strategy reduces internal pressures and signals that the respective
court is not an international outlier and, most importantly, it
advances transnational legal developments in climate change law.
It remains to be seen whether the comprehensive interpretation
of the material scope of the right to a healthy environment will
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lead the way further into this common sphere of interjurisdictional judicial discourse.

2021]

IN SEARCH OF A FAIR SHARE

921

922 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

